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THE CURIOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN “SELFDEPORTATION” POLICIES AND NATURALIZATION RATES
by
Angela M. Banks∗
Governor Mitt Romney has stated that the country’s immigration problems
can be solved through “self-deportation.” Arizona, Alabama, Georgia, South
Carolina, and Virginia agree. For example, K–12 public schools in
Alabama are required to ascertain the immigration status of all enrolling
students. Police officers in Arizona, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and
Virginia check the immigration status of all individuals booked into jail.
These “self-deportation” laws and policies, also known as immigration
enforcement through attrition, are designed to discourage and deter
unauthorized migration. Yet these policies are having a broader impact; they
are creating a hostile context of reception for immigrants regardless of their
immigration status. Social scientists have found that immigrants’ structural
and cultural environment—their context of reception—plays an important
role in shaping their incorporation patterns, including naturalization rates.
Based on this social science research I offer a new argument about the impact
of sub-federal immigration enforcement. Sub-federal immigration
enforcement has overwhelmingly taken the form of “self-deportation” laws
and policies. It is my contention that the growth of these policies may
discourage eligible immigrants from naturalizing. The use of racial profiling
to implement these policies shapes immigrants’ perceptions about the value of
citizenship. It reveals that ethnicity, foreignness, and immigration status are
often conflated, and that the social benefits of citizenship are not equally
available to all. Recognition of this reality may cause some immigrants to
conclude that the benefits of naturalization do not outweigh the costs. While
“self-deportation” policies may successfully deter and discourage
unauthorized migration, they may also discourage eligible Latino
immigrants from naturalizing and becoming formal members of U.S. society.

∗
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Ethnic Relations at Mount Holyoke College (Fall 2011). Anthony Balady, Christina
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assistance.

1149

LCB_16_4_Art_2_Banks.docx (Do Not Delete)

1150

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

1/9/2013 9:02 PM

[Vol. 16:4

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 1150
IMMIGRATION IN THE SOUTHEAST .................................... 1153
A. Demographics ..................................................................... 1154
B. Crime ...................................................................................... 1156
IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION ............................................. 1160
A. Naturalization .................................................................... 1160
B. Why Do Immigrants Naturalize? ........................................... 1163
1. The Material and Social Benefits of Citizenship .................. 1165
2. Context of Reception ....................................................... 1168
SUB-FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT .................. 1172
A. 287(g) ............................................................................... 1174
B. Secure Communities ............................................................. 1176
C. State Laws.......................................................................... 1179
ENFORCEMENT THROUGH TRAFFIC STOPS ...................... 1181
A. Discretion ........................................................................... 1182
1. Enforcement Priorities ..................................................... 1182
2. Citation or Custodial Arrest? ........................................... 1184
B. Pretext ............................................................................... 1186
C. Racial Profiling .................................................................. 1187
1. Legal Support for Racial Profiling .................................... 1189
2. Racial Profiling in Practice ............................................. 1193
DECIDING TO NATURALIZE ................................................... 1198
A. Variation in Naturalization Rates ......................................... 1199
B. Context of Reception & Naturalization Decisions..................... 1202
C. Alternative Explanations ...................................................... 1205
1. Naturalization as a Response to a Hostile Context .............. 1205
2. Does Legal Status Matter? ............................................... 1206
3. Variation Between Context of Reception Components ........... 1208
D. A Different Way Forward ...................................................... 1210
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 1212

I.
II.

III.

IV.

V.

INTRODUCTION
Governor Mitt Romney has stated that the country’s immigration
1
problems can be solved through “self-deportation.” Arizona and states
throughout the Southeast, like Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina,
2
agree. For example, K–12 public schools in Alabama are required to
3
ascertain the immigration status of all enrolling students. Police officers
1

Op-Ed., A Weakness for Romney, GOP, DENVER POST, June 25, 2012, at A17.
See Beason–Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 535 (LexisNexis) [hereinafter Beason–Hammon Act]; Support Our
Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (Arizona S.B. 1070), ch. 113, 2010
Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, amended by H.B. 2162, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070; Illegal
Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, No. 252, 2011 Ga. Laws 794
[hereinafter Ga. Immigration Law]; An Illegal Immigration Reform Bill, No. 69, 2011
S.C. Acts 325 [hereinafter S.C. Immigration Law].
3
Beason–Hammon Act § 28(a)(1).
2
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in Arizona, Alabama, Indiana, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia
4
check the immigration status of all individuals booked into jail.
Additionally, in Arizona, Alabama, and South Carolina, if during a lawful
stop, detention, or arrest a police officer has a reasonable suspicion that
an individual is not lawfully present, the officer is required to ascertain
5
the individual’s immigration status. These states also require employers
to use E-Verify to ensure that individuals hired are authorized to work in
6
the United States.
These “self-deportation” laws and policies, also known as
immigration enforcement through attrition, are designed to discourage
7
and deter unauthorized migration. Yet these policies are having a
broader impact; they are creating a hostile context of reception for all
immigrants, regardless of immigration status. Social scientists have found
that immigrants’ structural and cultural environment—their context of
reception—plays an important role in shaping immigrants’ incorporation
8
patterns, including naturalization rates.
Based on this social science research I offer a new argument about
the impact of sub-federal immigration enforcement. Immigration
scholars have focused on the legal authority of states and localities to
9
enact immigration-related laws, the use of racial profiling in local
4

ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133906 (2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-1-2 (LexisNexis 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-62
(2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-123 (Supp. 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-83.2 (2008).
5
ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(a); Arizona S.B. 1070 § 2; S.C. Immigration Law § 6. The
Supreme Court recently held that this provision of Arizona law is not preempted by
federal law. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012).
6
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214 (2012); Beason-Hammon Act § 15(b); S.C.
Immigration Law § 9(B).
7
RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: A
STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 6 (2011), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf; JESSICA M. VAUGHAN,
CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, ATTRITION THROUGH ENFORCEMENT: A COST-EFFECTIVE
STRATEGY TO SHRINK THE ILLEGAL POPULATION (Apr. 2006), available at
http://www.cis.org/articles/2006/back406.pdf; Valerie Barney et al., Peach Sheet,
Professions and Business, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 247, 250–51 (2006).
8
Throughout this Article I use the terms environment and context
interchangeably to refer to the structural and cultural setting that immigrants
encounter. See, e.g., IRENE BLOEMRAAD, BECOMING A CITIZEN: INCORPORATING
IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (2006); Irene
Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen in the United States and Canada: Structured Mobilization
and Immigrant Political Incorporation, 85 SOC. FORCES 667, 674 (2006) [hereinafter
Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen]; Irene Bloemraad, Citizenship Lessons from the Past: The
Contours of Immigrant Naturalization in the Early 20th Century, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 927, 928
(2006) [hereinafter Bloemraad, Citizenship Lessons from the Past]; John R. Logan et al.,
The Political and Community Context of Immigrant Naturalisation in the United States, 38 J.
ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 535 (2012); Jennifer Van Hook et al., For Love or Money?
Welfare Reform and Immigrant Naturalization, 85 SOC. FORCES 643, 647 (2006).
9
See, e.g., Nathan G. Cortez, The Local Dilemma: Preemption and the Role of Federal
Standards in State and Local Immigration Laws, 61 SMU L. REV. 47 (2008); Karla Mari
McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! “Illegal” Immigrants Beware: Local Immigration
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10

immigration enforcement, and a breakdown of trust between law
11
enforcement officials and immigrant communities. It is my contention
that the growth of state and local “self-deportation” laws and policies may
discourage eligible immigrants from naturalizing. Naturalization rates for
Mexican immigrants have remained disproportionately low. In 2010 only
12
10% of the 619,913 immigrants who naturalized were from Mexico. This
is despite Mexican immigrants accounting for 32.2% of immigrants
13
eligible to naturalize.
The use of racial profiling to implement “self-deportation” laws and
policies shapes immigrants’ perceptions about the value of citizenship. It
reveals that ethnicity, foreignness, and immigration status are often
conflated, and that the social benefits of citizenship are not equally
available to all. Recognition of this reality may cause some immigrants to
14
conclude that the benefits of naturalization do not outweigh the costs.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I explains the growth of local
immigration enforcement and its concentration in the Southeast. This
region of the United States has experienced rapid demographic changes
due to immigration, which has prompted state and local government
officials to become more active in immigration enforcement. Part II
Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 26–
27 (2007); Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption,
Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27; Cristina M.
Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567
(2008); Victor C. Romero, Devolution and Discrimination, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
377 (2002); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 57; Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 1627 (1997); Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C.
L. REV. 1619 (2008); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the
Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001).
10
See, e.g., David A. Selden et al., Placing S.B. 1070 and Racial Profiling into Context,
and What S.B. 1070 Reveals About the Legislative Process in Arizona, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 523
(2011).
11
A lack of trust can lead to decreased immigrant cooperation with law
enforcement agents and therefore less police protection in immigrant communities.
See Jennifer M. Chacón, Border Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 129 (2010); Jacqueline Hagan et al., The Effects of U.S. Deportation Policies on
Immigrant Families and Communities: Cross-Border Perspectives, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1799 (2010);
Bill Ong Hing, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids, and Immigration Reform, 44 U.S.F. L. REV.
307 (2009); Lisa R. Pruitt, Latina/os, Locality, and Law in the Rural South, 12 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 135 (2009); Virginia Martinez et al., A Community Under Siege: The Impact
of Anti-Immigrant Hysteria on Latinos, 2 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 101 (2008); Yolanda
Vázquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the
Incorporation of Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54 HOW. L.J. 639 (2011).
12
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2010 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 55 tbl.21 (Aug. 2011).
13
NANCY RYTINA, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2010, at 4 tbl.4 (2011).
14
See, e.g., Van Hook et al., supra note 8, at 647 (noting that immigrants are more
likely to “pursue social and legal integration if they perceive the host society’s system
of status attainment as open and social mobility possible”).
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argues that immigrants naturalize in order to take advantage of the social
and material benefits of citizenship. Immigrants’ structural and cultural
environment, their context of reception, provides information about
whether the social and material benefits of citizenship will be available to
them. Part III describes one aspect of immigrants’ context of reception—
state and local immigration enforcement policy. Part IV demonstrates
that racial profiling and minor traffic violations are key aspects of state
and local immigration enforcement strategies in the Southeast. Part V
contends that these strategies create a hostile context of reception and
reveal that citizenship may not provide all of the expected social benefits.
“Self-deportation” policies may successfully deter and discourage
unauthorized migration, but it may come at the cost of fewer Latino
immigrants naturalizing and becoming formal members of U.S. society.
I. IMMIGRATION IN THE SOUTHEAST
Unauthorized migration has become a significant political issue in
the Southeast as the demographics in this part of the country have
changed. Unauthorized migrants are blamed for increased criminal
activity, depleting limited government resources, and reducing
15
employment opportunities for Americans and lawful migrants. The
federal government’s failure to effectively limit or prevent unauthorized
migration has led states to demand greater involvement in immigration
enforcement. State laws encouraging unauthorized migrants to “selfdeport” have become a popular choice. Within the Southeast this has
meant state laws requiring public health officials, K-12 school officials,
and law enforcement officers to determine the immigration status of
individuals being served and report unauthorized migrants to
16
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Legislators state that
these laws are intended to discourage, reduce, and ultimately eliminate
17
unauthorized migration.
Between 1990 and 2010 the Southeast became a new destination for
18
large-scale Latino immigration. This Part describes the demographic
changes that the region experienced in this time period and the legal
responses to these changes.

15

See infra Part I.B.
See, e.g., Beason–Hammon Act, 2011 Ala. Adv. Legis. Serv. 535 (LexisNexis);
Ga. Immigration Law, 2011 Ga. Laws 794.
17
See, e.g., Barney et al., supra note 7, at 251; VAUGHAN, supra note 7, at 13.
18
HELEN B. MARROW, NEW DESTINATION DREAMING: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND
LEGAL STATUS IN THE RURAL AMERICAN SOUTH (2011).
16
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A. Demographics
Of the ten states with the largest Latino growth between 1990 and
19
2010, eight are located in the Southeast. The increases these states have
20
experienced range from nearly 400% to over 900%.
TABLE 1. Increase in Latino Population
21
1999–2010
STATE

1990–2010 % INCREASE

North Carolina

942.8%

Arkansas

836.1%

Tennessee

785.9%

Georgia

683.8%

South Carolina

671.4%

Alabama

653.6%

Kentucky

504.2%

Nevada

475.9%

Mississippi

411.5%

Minnesota

364.4%

As a result, states like North Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia have seen
22
Latinos go from being 2% or less of the state’s population to almost 9%.
23

TABLE 2. Latino Population by State 1990 and 2010
STATE

19

LATINO POPULATION

LATINO POPULATION

1990

2010

North Carolina

1.2%

8.4%

Arkansas

0.8%

6.4%

Tennessee

0.7%

4.6%

Georgia

1.7%

8.8%

South Carolina

0.9%

5.1%

Alabama

0.6%

3.9%

Kentucky

0.6%

3.1%

Mississippi

0.6%

2.7%

Virginia

2.6%

7.9%

Maryland

2.6%

8.2%

See SHARON R. ENNIS ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION:
2010, at 6 tbl.2 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/
c2010br-04.pdf; BETTY GUZMÁN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION: 2000,
at 4 tbl.2 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-3.pdf.
20
See ENNIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6 tbl.2; GUZMÁN, supra note 19, at 4 tbl.2.
21
See ENNIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6 tbl.2; GUZMÁN, supra note 19, at 4 tbl.2.
22
See ENNIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6 tbl.2; GUZMÁN, supra note 19, at 4 tbl.2.
23
See ENNIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6 tbl.2; GUZMÁN, supra note 19, at 4 tbl.2.
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A significant portion of the Latino population in southeastern states is
comprised of U.S. citizens, green-card holders who are formally referred
24
to as lawful permanent residents (LPRs), and nonimmigrants. While
southeastern states have a higher proportion of unauthorized migrants
than traditional Latino immigrant destinations like California, Texas, and
Florida, citizens and lawful migrants account for at least half of the
25
Latino population in the Southeast. Even if one were to assume that all
unauthorized migrants in the Southeast are Latinos, approximately half
26
of the Latino residents would still be citizens or lawful migrants. For
example, in 2010 unauthorized migrants accounted for 4.1% of North
27
Carolina’s population and the Latino population was 8.4%. Similarly in
Georgia unauthorized migrants accounted for 4.7% of the state’s
28
population and Latinos accounted for 8.8%. Despite the variation of
legal statuses represented within the Latino population, politicians often
29
conflate Latinos and unauthorized migrants. Conflating these two
populations undermines the incorporation of lawfully present Latino
immigrants.
The existence of an unauthorized migrant population in the
Southeast has prompted calls for greater immigration enforcement by
federal, state, and local officials. One of the concerns driving the need
for greater immigration enforcement has been a perception that the
unauthorized migrant population is causing an increase in violent crime.
24

See MARROW, supra note 18, at 6 map 3; JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR.,
GROWING SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS CHOOSING NATURALIZATION 29–30 (2007), available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/74.pdf. Lawful permanent residents are
noncitizens who have been granted permission to reside in the United States
indefinitely. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15) (2006). Nonimmigrants are noncitizens who have been granted
permission to enter the United States for a specific purpose for a specified period of
time. INA § 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1184. For example, a foreign student who is admitted
pursuant to a student visa is a nonimmigrant. The student is admitted to attend
school and is allowed to remain in the United States for a specified period of time.
25
See MARROW, supra note 18, at 6–7 & map 3; see infra text accompanying notes
26–28.
26
This assumption would overestimate the number of Latino unauthorized
migrants because recent Department of Homeland Security statistics indicate that
unauthorized migrants hail from Mexico, Central America, China, India, the
Philippines, Brazil, and Korea. MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT
POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2010, at 4 tbl.3 (Feb. 2011),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.pdf.
The percentage of unauthorized migrants from Mexico, Central and South America
is high, but it is not 100%. Id. (estimating this portion of the unauthorized
population to be approximately 80%).
27
See ENNIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6 tbl.2; HOEFER, supra note 26, at 4 tbl.4.
28
See ENNIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6 tbl.2; HOEFER, supra note 26, at 4 tbl.4.
29
See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 8, Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v.
Magee, No. 2:11cv982-MHT (M.D. Ala. Nov. 18, 2011) (providing statements of
Alabama legislators conflating Latino and unauthorized migrants).
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B. Crime
A perceived connection between immigrants and crime dates back to
30
the nineteenth century. During that time period immigrants were
blamed for increased criminal activity in cities like New York and
31
Chicago. Today immigrants, particularly unauthorized migrants, are
blamed for drug-related crimes and drunk driving accidents. Social
science research, however, shows that increased immigration does not
lead to increased crime. As early as 1911 the Dillingham Commission
concluded:
No satisfactory evidence has yet been produced to show that
immigration has resulted in an increase in crime disproportionate
to the increase in adult population. Such comparable statistics of
crime and population as it has been possible to obtain indicate that
immigrants are less prone to commit crime than are native
32
Americans.
In 1994 the United States Commission on Immigration Reform
33
reached similar conclusions. Additionally, crime rates declined in the
1990s and early 2000s despite historic highs in authorized and
34
unauthorized migration. Between 1994 and 2006 the foreign-born

30

Historically within the United States public sentiment has linked increased
immigration with higher crime rates. In the early twentieth century this perception
led to the enactment of the first comprehensive crime-based deportation regime.
Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling
in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v.
United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1024
(2010); Angela M. Banks, The Normative & Historical Cases for Proportional Deportation,
62 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 17–21) (manuscript on file with
author). In the 1980s this concern supported harsher immigration consequences for
noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies. Banks, supra (manuscript at 43). With
increased concerns about unauthorized migration and immigrant criminality in the
1990s legislative reform expanded the aggravated felony definition and created
harsher immigration consequences for noncitizens convicted of these crimes. Id.
31
See, e.g., FREDERIC J. HASKIN, THE IMMIGRANT: AN ASSET AND A LIABILITY ch. 18
(1913) (discussing the “oft-repeated statement that the aliens coming to America are
distinguished for their criminal tendencies”); CYRUS PEIRCE, CRIME: ITS CAUSE AND
CURE 29–32 (Boston, Crosby, Nichols, & Co. 1854) (decrying the trend of immigrants
to remain in large cities and proposing inducements to convince them to move to the
rural west).
32
S. Doc. No. 61-747, at 163 (1910).
33
U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY: RESTORING
CREDIBILITY 4 (1994).
34
RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., THE MYTH OF
IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION: INCARCERATION RATES AMONG
NATIVE AND FOREIGN-BORN MEN 4 (2007), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/
sites/default/files/docs/Imm%20Criminality%20(IPC).pdf; see also M. Kathleen
Dingeman & Rubén G. Rumbaut, The Immigration-Crime Nexus and Post-Deportation
Experiences: En/Countering Stereotypes in Southern California and El Salvador, 31 U. LA
VERNE L. REV. 363, 372 (2010).
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35

population increased 71% from 22 million to 38 million. During this
36
same time period there was a 34.2% decrease in the violent crime rate.
The homicide rate decreased 37.8%, the robbery rate dropped 40.8%,
37
and the assault rate fell 31.9%.
Despite this evidence, immigrant populations continue to be blamed
for criminal activity in southeastern communities. For example, the
Davidson County Sheriff’s Office in Tennessee identified the arrest of six
unauthorized migrants for homicide during the summer of 2006 as the
38
impetus for its 287(g) program. The fact that several of these
individuals had previously been arrested for misdemeanor crimes
supported the community’s belief that 287(g) could be an effective tool
39
for protecting public safety. The sheriff in Gwinnett County, Georgia
was motivated to enter into a 287(g) agreement to combat the expansion
40
of Mexican cartels within the county. Within the space of one week two
sets of Mexican drug dealers were arrested in Gwinnett County on the
41
same street. One arrest led to one of the largest methamphetamine
busts in history and the other led to a gun battle that ended with one
42
person dead. Gwinnett County Sheriff Butch Conway stated that an
effective way to fight the cartels was to deport any “illegal” that commits a
43
crime, even a traffic offense. He stated that an individual could be a
major in a cartel and if he is pulled over for no license he is going to be
44
deported. Sheriff Neil Warren in Cobb County, Georgia also saw a
connection between the increase in unauthorized migration and
45
methamphetamine activity in the metro Atlanta area. In Manassas
County, Virginia residents founded Help Save Manassas to deal with
concerns about unauthorized migration. Help Save Manassas was worried
about unauthorized migrants involved in gang-related murders, rapes,

35

Dingeman & Rumbaut, supra note 34, at 373.
RUMBAUT & EWING, supra note 34, at 4.
37
Id.
38
DAVIDSON CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, 287(G) TWO-YEAR REVIEW 4 (2009), available
at http://blackburn.house.gov/UploadedFiles/287g_Two_Year_Review.pdf. The 287(g)
program allows state and local law enforcement officials to enforce federal
immigration law. See infra Part III.A for a more detailed discussion of the 287(g)
program.
39
See Daron Hall, Op-Ed., The 287(g) Program Is Working, and Residents Are Safer
Because of It, TENNESSEAN, Aug. 12, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 26372843.
40
Dustin Inman Society, 287(g); Gwinnett County GA—ENFORCEMENT WORKS!,
YOUTUBE (May 20, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EvkKTekM8Yo&noredirect=1
(CBS Atlanta local news report).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Al Meyer, Neil Warren at the Cobb County GOP Breakfast, COBB COUNTY
REPUBLICAN (Apr. 28, 2005), http://theconservativesentinel.blogspot.com/2005_04_
01_archive.html.
36
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and child sexual assaults. To address these concerns Help Save Manassas
46
lobbied for a 287(g) agreement.
In addition to concerns about serious or violent crimes, drinking and
driving cases involving unauthorized migrants became another
justification for increased local immigration enforcement. Between 2003
and 2008 over one-third of the drunk driving charges in Johnston
47
County, North Carolina have been levied against Latinos. Stories such as
that of Luciano Tellez captivate communities and serve as rallying cries
48
for local immigration enforcement. Mr. Tellez was an unauthorized
migrant when he ran a stop sign, ran into another car, and caused an
explosion. Mr. Tellez killed a man and a nine-year old boy and sped away
from the scene of the accident. When his car was stopped it was littered
49
with beer cans. In another incident seven-year old Marcus Lassiter was
50
killed when a stolen car driven by Hipolito Camora Hernandez hit him.
Hernandez was charged with second-degree murder, speeding, and
51
driving while intoxicated. Hernandez had been arrested previously for
52
driving while intoxicated, but he was never convicted. The article
reporting this story does not mention Hernandez’s immigration status,
but Sheriff Bizzell is quoted saying, “If [Hernandez] hadn’t been here to
start with, that wouldn’t have happened. A 7-year old that’s playing in his
53
front yard pays the ultimate price for another drunk Mexican.”
Johnston County, North Carolina is not the only jurisdiction to
experience drunk driving fatalities at the hands of unauthorized
migrants. An unauthorized migrant who was driving while intoxicated
killed Scott Gardner, a Gaston County, North Carolina high school
54
teacher. Mr. Gardner’s wife was also in the vehicle and was left in critical

46
Statement on New 287(g) Agreement, HELP SAVE MANASSAS, http://www.helpsave
manassas.org/index.php/press-releases/new-287g-agreement.
47
Kristin Collins, Tolerance Wears Thin, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 7,
2008, at A1.
48
Johnston County does not have a 287(g) agreement, but Sheriff Steve Bizzell
brokered a deal with Wake County whereby some unauthorized migrants arrested in
Johnston County are taken to Wake County where a 287(g) jail enforcement
agreement exists. Sarah Ovaska, Deportation Fear Fuels Fight, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), June 12, 2008, at A1.
49
Collins, supra note 47.
50
Ovaska, supra note 48.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Press Release, Richard Burr, U.S. Senator of N.C., Burr, Dole Re-Introduce the
Scott Gardner Act (Mar. 13, 2007), http://burr.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=a36192c1-9e65-4863-9546d1ce0de1bb6b; Karen Shugart, Driving While Hispanic, CREATIVE LOAFING CHARLOTTE
(Dec. 21, 2005), http://clclt.com/charlotte/Content?oid=2360315; Illegal Immigrant
Indicted for 2nd Degree Murder, WECT (Aug. 1, 2005), http://www.wect.com/Global/
story.asp?S=3668666&nav=2gQccpas.
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56

condition. The driver had several previous DUI convictions. In
Georgia, two car accidents in Cobb County involving unlicensed
unauthorized migrants caused the death of a Cobb County deputy and
57
the father of six children. The Sheriff’s Department of Alamance
County in North Carolina contends that DUIs are the number one killer
58
of Latino males. These accidents are used to highlight the importance
59
of local immigration enforcement, specifically 287(g) agreements.
Within the past twenty years, southeastern states have experienced a
significant increase in the Latino population. This growth is the result of
60
both births and immigration. Part of that growth is due to unauthorized
migration, and residents within the Southeast blame unauthorized
migrants for drug-related criminal activity and drunk driving.
Unauthorized migrants’ perceived disproportionate involvement in
criminal activity has fueled support for state and local law enforcement
officials to be involved in immigration enforcement.
As southeastern states have struggled to address the local challenges
related to unauthorized migration, less attention has been paid to
incorporating
lawfully
present
Latinos
(citizens,
green-card
holders/LPRs, and nonimmigrants) into the local communities in which
they reside and work. Immigrant incorporation is achieved when
immigrants are integrated into U.S. society such that it is difficult to
differentiate their legal protections, access to public resources,
educational outcomes, language skills, and job opportunities from those
61
of native-born citizens. Certain strategies and policies for addressing
55

Illegal Immigrant Indicted for 2nd Degree Murder, supra note 54.
Id.; Press Release, Richard Burr, supra note 54.
57
Brian Feagans, Bills Aim to Tighten Clamps on Illegals, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb.
11, 2007, at D1.
58
Karen Welsh, Illegal Immigrants Filling Jails, CAROLINA J. ONLINE (July 27, 2006),
http://www.carolinajournal.com/articles/display_story.html?id=3465.
59
These concerns also motivated the 287(g) agreement in Nashville, Tennessee.
Amada Armenta, From Sheriff’s Deputies to Immigration Officers: Screening Immigrant Status
in a Tennessee Jail, 34 LAW & POL’Y. 191, 196 (2012). Drunk driving and other forms of
impaired driving are serious threats to public safety. Community outrage about drunk
driving has been particularly vociferous when the drivers are immigrants, particularly
unauthorized migrants. Drunk driving accidents involving citizens have not raised the
same types of concerns within communities. When accidents have involved
unauthorized migrants, the public has called for the broken immigration system to be
reformed. Public officials contend that “only a lockdown on our borders could
remedy this situation.” Shugart, supra note 54. When accidents involve Latino
immigrant victims and United States citizen drunk drivers, no similar outrage is
visible. Id. Drunk driving is serious no matter who is behind the wheel, but there is
little justification for treating the crime differently when committed by unauthorized
migrants rather than citizens.
60
See Stephen Ceasar, U.S. Hispanic Population Tops 50 Million, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
25, 2011, (Nation) at 15.
61
See RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM:
ASSIMILATION AND CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION 5–6, 11–12 (2003); ALEJANDRO PORTES
& RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT 13, 232–41 (3d ed. 2006)
56
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unauthorized migration can undermine the immigrant incorporation
process for lawfully present migrants. Part II uses social science theory on
immigrant incorporation to explain how immigration enforcement
strategies can undermine immigrant incorporation by discouraging
green-card holders from naturalizing.
II. IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION
A. Naturalization
E pluribus unum, a melting pot, a tossed salad, a mosaic. These are all
terms that are used to describe the various ways in which immigrants are
62
incorporated into U.S. society. The United States prides itself in being a
country of immigrants that is simultaneously a cohesive nation-state.
Whether or not immigrants are incorporated into U.S. society is an issue
of importance to the government and social scientists. Federal agencies
and courts have identified it as an important goal, and social scientists
have investigated the processes by which incorporation occurs.
From 1795 to 1952, U.S. law treated immigration as a process by
63
which foreign-born residents became citizens. During this time period
the naturalization process required applicants to submit a declaration of
64
intent several years before actually naturalizing. Once this declaration
was submitted, the “intending citizen” had rights, benefits, and access to
resources that were unavailable to immigrants who had not filed the
[hereinafter PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA]; ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G.
RUMBAUT, LEGACIES: THE STORY OF THE IMMIGRANT SECOND GENERATION 46–48 (2001)
[hereinafter PORTES & RUMBAUT, LEGACIES].
62
Throughout this paper I use the terms incorporated and assimilated
interchangeably. Both terms refer to the cultural and structural inclusion of
immigrants in American society. Cultural incorporation, also referred to as
acculturation, is the process by which immigrants adopt the language, culture, ideals,
values, and behaviors of the receiving society. PORTES & RUMBAUT, LEGACIES, supra
note 61, at 46. Structural incorporation focuses on immigrants’ place within a
society’s socioeconomic hierarchy. Alejandro Portes & Alejandro Rivas, The
Adaptation of Migrant Children, 21 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 219 (2011), available at
http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/21_01_10.pdf; see
also MILTON M. GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE ROLE OF RACE,
RELIGION, AND NATIONAL ORIGINS (1964); Min Zhou, Segmented Assimilation: Issues,
Controversies, and Recent Research on the New Second Generation, 31 INT’L MIGRATION REV.
975, 977 (1997). This is typically measured by examining educational attainment,
residential concentration, intermarriage rates, and employment. PORTES & RUMBAUT,
LEGACIES, supra note 61, at 46–50.
63
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2006).
64
Id.; see also Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137; Naturalization Act of
1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254; Naturalization Law of 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153, amended by
Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 54, 16 Stat. 254; Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 54, 1
Stat. 556 (repealed 1802); U.S. Naturalization Act of 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414, repealed
by Naturalization Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 556; U.S. Naturalization Law of 1790, ch.3, 1
Stat. 103, repealed by U.S. Naturalization Act of 1795, 1 Stat. 414.
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65

declaration. For example, intending citizens were eligible for land
grants pursuant to the Homestead Act of 1862, occasionally granted
diplomatic protection by the United States when abroad, and could vote
66
until the early twentieth century. Hiroshi Motomura contends that
67
during this time period immigrants were seen as Americans in waiting.
68
There was a presumption that eligible immigrants would naturalize.
Immigration was viewed as a process that ended with naturalization. The
extension of rights, benefits, and access to resources allowed immigrants
to reap the material benefits of citizenship before that status was officially
granted. U.S. law no longer extends these material benefits to intending
69
citizens and the declaration of intention was made optional in 1952.
The process of becoming a citizen is no longer a gradual process, but
immigrant incorporation remains a goal of U.S. immigration law.
70
Naturalization is one way in which this goal is operationalized.
In 1997 the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform highlighted
the importance of immigrant incorporation. The Commission referred to
71
this process as Americanization. Americanization was defined as “the
process of integration by which immigrants become part of our
communities,” it is the “civic incorporation of immigrants, that is the
cultivation of a shared commitment to the American values of liberty,
72
democracy, and equal opportunity.” Naturalization plays an important
part in this process. The Commission noted that “[n]aturalization is the
most important act a legal immigrant undertakes in the process of
73
becoming an American.” President Bush’s Task Force on New
Americans reiterated the importance of immigrant incorporation and
naturalization in 2006. This task force was charged with strengthening

65

MOTOMURA, supra note 63, at 8–9.
Id. at 9.
67
Id.
68
This presumption only extended to those immigrants who were eligible for
naturalization. Between 1790 and 1952 there were racial restrictions on
naturalization. IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
42–43 (1996). There was no presumption that racially ineligible immigrants would
become citizens.
69
MOTOMURA, supra note 63, at 9, 116.
70
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7
CONST. COMMENT. 9, 16 (1990) (“Although federal law does not require that resident
aliens apply for naturalization, citizenship is clearly the intended end of the
immigration process. Given the predominant American view that most foreigners
would acquire U.S. citizenship if they could, resident aliens who choose not to
naturalize are subject to criticism or suspicion.” (footnote omitted)).
71
U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION
AND IMMIGRANT POLICY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY v–vii (1997); see also Final Report of the
Commission on Immigration Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 9–11 (1997) (statement of Hon. Shirley
M. Hufstedler, Chair, U.S. Comm’n on Immigration Reform).
72
U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 71, at vi.
73
Id. at xii.
66
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federal, state, and local agency efforts “to help legal immigrants embrace
the common core of American civic culture, learn our common
74
language, and fully become Americans.”
Immigration law and policy, historically and today, have viewed
naturalization as an important goal of the immigration process.
Naturalization symbolizes the complete incorporation of immigrants in
American society. Failed incorporation threatens the realization of e
75
pluribus unum. The Supreme Court recognized the problems that arise
when immigrants are not successfully incorporated into U.S. society. In
Plyler v. Doe the Court stated that the existence of “a substantial ‘shadow
population’” of unauthorized migrants
raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident
aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap
labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes
available to citizens and lawful residents. The existence of such an
underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides
76
itself on adherence to principles of equality under law.
If immigrants are failing to naturalize because they believe that they will
not be able to fully reap the social benefits of citizenship, a fundamental
immigration policy goal has been thwarted.
Immigrant incorporation has also been a perennial area of study for
immigration scholars. Scholars initially studied the assimilation of
Southern and Eastern European immigrants during the late 19th and
77
early 20th century. These immigrants were deemed “undesirable,
78
unassimilable, and hostile or indifferent to American values.” Once
Southern and Eastern European immigrants successfully assimilated,
scholars began to examine how that process occurred and whether it was
unique to that historical moment and the characteristics of those
79
immigrants. These questions became relevant again when examining
the trajectory of post-1965 immigrants who are overwhelmingly from
74

TASK FORCE ON NEW AMERICANS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUILDING AN
AMERICANIZATION MOVEMENT FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY iv (2008).
75
This is the national motto, which means “from many, one.” U.S. COMM’N ON
IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 71, at v n.2. The Commission on Immigration
Reform noted that this motto “has also come to mean the vital unity of our national
community founded on individual freedom and the diversity that flows from it.” Id.
76
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218–19 (1982).
77
GORDON, supra note 62; ROBERT EZRA PARK, RACE AND CULTURE (1950); ROBERT
E. PARK ET AL., THE CITY (1925); W. LLOYD WARNER & LEO SROLE, THE SOCIAL SYSTEMS
OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS (1945).
78
LEONARD DINNERSTEIN & DAVID M. REIMERS, ETHNIC AMERICANS: A HISTORY OF
IMMIGRATION 96 (5th ed. 2009).
79
See, e.g., TOMÁS R. JIMÉNEZ, REPLINISHED ETHNICITY: MEXICAN AMERICANS,
IMMIGRATION, AND IDENTITY 140–41 (2010); MARROW, supra note 18; DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY & MAGALY SÁNCHEZ R., BROKERED BOUNDARIES: CREATING IMMIGRANT IDENTITY
IN ANTI-IMMIGRANT TIMES (2010); PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note
61, at 91–93; PORTES & RUMBAUT, LEGACIES, supra note 61, at 44–49; MARY C. WATERS,
BLACK IDENTITIES: WEST INDIAN IMMIGRANT DREAMS AND AMERICAN REALITIES (1999).

LCB_16_4_Art_2_Banks.docx (Do Not Delete)

1/9/2013 9:02 PM

2012] “SELF-DEPORTATION” POLICIES & NATURALIZATION

1163

Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Would the differences in race, ethnicity,
and labor market conditions make it harder for post-1965 immigrants to
successfully assimilate? Recent theories on the incorporation of post-1965
immigrants focus on context of reception as an important factor. This
section utilizes the context of reception model to examine the impact
that local immigration enforcement strategies can have on naturalization
rates.
B. Why Do Immigrants Naturalize?
Not everyone can naturalize. Naturalization is available to
noncitizens who are at least eighteen years old, have a green card, have
resided in the United States continuously for five years, are persons of
good moral character, are “attached to the principles of the Constitution
of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness
of the United States,” are able to read, write, and speak English, and are
80
knowledgeable about U.S. history and government.
Naturalization is the only means by which immigrants become full
members of the American polity. Citizens have the most extensive bundle
of rights within the United States. The rights to vote and remain in the
81
United States are considered two of the most important rights. Many
scholars contend that access to the material benefits of citizenship shape
82
naturalization decisions. Yet naturalization also provides immigrants
with social benefits, such a sense of acceptance and membership within
83
the host society and social mobility. The social environment that
immigrants experience conveys valuable information about whether
immigrants are welcome, whether the host society values immigrant
84
contributions, and whether acceptance and mobility will be possible.
Immigrants are more likely to “pursue social and legal integration if they
perceive the host society’s system of status attainment as open and social
80
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §§ 316, 334(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427,
1445(b) (2006); 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–.5 (2012). The residence requirement is only three
years if the individual is the spouse of a U.S. citizen. INA § 319, 8 U.S.C. § 1430.
81
See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 163–75 (1998).
82
See, e.g., DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE
DECLINE OF CITIZENSHIP 39–40, 65 (1996); GUILLERMINA JASSO & MARK R. ROSENZWEIG,
THE NEW CHOSEN PEOPLE: IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 99–101 (1990); SCHUCK,
supra note 81, at 164–75.
83
John A. Garcia, Political Integration of Mexican Immigrants: Explorations into the
Naturalization Process, 15 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 608, 617 (1981); Kerstin Gerst &
Jeffrey A. Burr, Welfare Use Among Older Hispanic Immigrants: The Effect of State and
Federal Policy, 30 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 129, 132 (2011). Naturalization can
also generate new social networks and increase access to old social networks, which
can assist with upward mobility. Irene Bloemraad, The North American Naturalization
Gap: An Institutional Approach to Citizenship Acquisition in the United States and Canada,
36 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 193, 214 (2002); Logan et al., supra note 8, at 549; Van Hook
et al., supra note 8, at 644, 647.
84
Logan et al., supra note 8, at 549; Van Hook et al., supra note 8, at 647.
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85

mobility possible.” Immigrants use their environment to ascertain
whether or not the United States is a place where they can do well.
The decision to naturalize has been conceptualized in two distinct
ways. First, naturalization is seen as the culmination of the assimilation or
86
incorporation process. Naturalization marks integration into the “social,
87
cultural and political life of the receiving society.” This perception of
naturalization is supported by research that explains who naturalizes by
focusing on individual and community characteristics. Those most likely
to naturalize are those who own homes, speak English, have lived in the
United States longer, have more education, or live in immigrant
88
communities with high naturalization rates. These characteristics reflect
89
acceptance and adherence to middle-class American values. Second,
naturalization is viewed as an instrumental or defensive decision. Within
this conception of naturalization, immigrants naturalize in order to
maintain or obtain access to material benefits uniquely available to
90
citizens. This has been referred to as defensive, instrumental, or

85

Van Hook et al., supra note 8, at 647.
See, e.g., Greta Gilbertson & Audrey Singer, The Emergence of Protective Citizenship
in the USA: Naturalization Among Dominican Immigrants in the Post-1996 Welfare Reform
Era, 26 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 25, 26 (2003) (discussing this perspective); Robert C.
Smith, Transnational Localities: Community, Technology and the Politics of Membership
Within the Context of Mexico and U.S. Migration, in TRANSNATIONALISM FROM BELOW 196–
97 (Michael Peter Smith & Luis Eduardo Guarnizo eds. 1998).
87
Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at 26.
88
See, e.g., JASSO & ROSENZWEIG, supra note 82, at 101, 117–21; Guillermina Jasso
& Mark R. Rosenzweig, Family Reunification and the Immigration Multiplier: U.S.
Immigration Law, Origin-Country Conditions, and the Reproduction of Immigrants, 23
DEMOGRAPHY 291, 301–04 (1986); Zai Liang, Social Contact, Social Capital, and the
Naturalization Process: Evidence from Six Immigrant Groups, 23 SOC. SCI. RES. 407, 431
(1994); Alejandro Portes & John W. Curtis, Changing Flags: Naturalization and its
Determinants Among Mexican Immigrants, 21 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 352, 365–70 (1987);
Philip Q. Yang, Explaining Immigrant Naturalization, 28 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 449, 464,
474 (1994).
89
These characteristics are seen to matter because individuals with them
understand the benefits of naturalizing more quickly than individuals without these
characteristics. PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 61, at 144, 146.
Research has consistently shown that there is less disparity in naturalization rates the
longer individuals have resided in the United States. Id. at 146 (noting that “the
passage of time leads inexorably to higher levels of naturalization”). Research has also
noted that those with fewer individual resources and skills may find the naturalization
process more difficult. Id. at 146. This mirrors another category of explanations for
naturalization rates and that is regulatory and bureaucratic barriers. Mexican
immigrants are predicted to have lower naturalization rates because they typically do
not have the skills and resources that are associated with high naturalization rates. Id.
at 144–46.
90
See, e.g., Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at 30; Audrey Singer & Greta
Gilbertson, Naturalization in the Wake of Anti-Immigrant Legislation: Dominicans in New
York City 3 (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Working Paper No. 10, 2000),
available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dominican.pdf.
86
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91

protective naturalization. Here, the decision to naturalize has nothing
to do with identity or a sense of membership within the polity.
1. The Material and Social Benefits of Citizenship
These two perspectives on naturalization reflect the different
categories of benefits that citizenship offers. For those immigrants who
view naturalization as an indication of complete incorporation into U.S.
society the availability of the social benefits of citizenship will play an
important role in the decision making process. For those who view
naturalization as a means to a specific material end, the availability of the
material benefits of citizenship will likely be decisive. In reality,
individuals likely view naturalization as both a marker of incorporation
and a means to material benefits.
The social science naturalization literature focused on the material
benefits of citizenship in the wake of the 1996 immigration and welfare
reforms. Scholars have debated whether linking more benefits to
92
citizenship would cause eligible green-card holders to naturalize. What
has been examined less is the impact of differential access to the social
benefits of citizenship. This section discusses the social and material
benefits of citizenship and argues that both categories of benefits factor
into immigrants’ decisions to naturalize.
A growing body of social science research contends that immigrants
naturalize for defensive reasons—to retain or gain access to material
93
benefits that are exclusively available to U.S. citizens. This conception of
the decision to naturalize has little to do with conceptions of identity or
belonging. Here naturalization is viewed as a means to a material end.
The empirical evidence demonstrating defensive or instrumental
naturalization is mixed. A number of scholars have found that
naturalization rates increased after the enactment of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA), which eliminated green-card holders’ eligibility for federal

91

Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at 29–30, 44–45.
See infra Part II(B)(2) for further discussion of these research findings.
93
See, e.g., GEORGE J. BORJAS, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE IMPACT OF
WELFARE REFORM ON IMMIGRANT WELFARE USE 9 (2002) [hereinafter BORJAS, THE
IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM], available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/borjas.pdf;
Kelly Stamper Balistreri & Jennifer Van Hook, The More Things Change the More They
Stay the Same: Mexican Naturalization Before and After Welfare Reform, 38 INT’L MIGRATION
REV. 113 (2004); George J. Borjas, Welfare Reform and Immigrant Participation in Welfare
Programs, 36 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 1093, 1094 (2002) [hereinafter Borjas, Welfare
Reform and Immigrant Participation]; Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at 30; Michael
Jones-Correa, Institutional and Contextual Factors in Immigrant Naturalization and Voting, 5
CITIZENSHIP STUD. 41, 41 (2001); Paul M. Ong, Defensive Naturalization and AntiImmigrant Sentiment: Chinese Immigrants in Three Primate Metropolises, 21 ASIAN AM. POL’Y
REV. 39 (2011), available at http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic855678.files/
AAPR_2_15_11_FINAL%20_3_.pdf.
92
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94

welfare benefits. Yet other scholars have found that access to welfare
95
benefits does not increase the probability of naturalizing. Access to
welfare benefits however, is not the only material benefit of
naturalization, and Congress restored green-card holders access to
96
certain welfare benefits in 1997. Other material benefits include voting
97
rights, access to certain jobs, and exemption from U.S. immigration law.
Immigrants likely view each of these material benefits differently and
consequently weigh them differently when deciding whether or not to
naturalize. For example, Balistreri and Van Hook found some support
for the proposition that immigrants naturalized “in response to policies
that restrict the ability to sponsor their relatives for legal migration to the
98
United States.” Similarly Gilbertson and Singer’s qualitative study of
Dominican immigrants in New York found that immigrants naturalized
in order to facilitate transnational residence (unrestricted travel to and
99
from the United States) and to be eligible for a broader range of jobs.
The prospect of voting rights has also been considered a factor
100
influencing naturalization decisions. One response to a negative or
hostile environment is to seek greater political engagement in order to
facilitate change. Scholars and community organizations have noted that
hostile contexts of reception can motivate some immigrants to
101
naturalize. The Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles
contends that Proposition 187 motivated immigrants to naturalize so that
102
they could vote its supporters out of office. During the March 2006
94

Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 402, 431(b), 110 Stat. 2105, 2262–65, 2274 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612, 1641(b)). For evidence that naturalization rates
increased, see, for example, BORJAS, THE IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM, supra note 93, at
9; George J. Borjas, Welfare Reform and Immigration, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE
369, 379–81 (Rebecca M. Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001); Borjas, Welfare Reform and
Immigrant Participation, supra note 93, at 1094; Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at
43 (“The decline in concern about acquiring U.S. citizenship, in large part because
many of the benefits that were ‘taken away’ from legal permanent residents have
been restored.”).
95
See, e.g., Balistreri & Van Hook, supra note 93, at 125–28; Van Hook et al., supra
note 8, at 655.
96
Michael Fix & Wendy Zimmermann, All Under One Roof: Mixed-Status Families in
an Era of Reform, 35 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 397, 415 & n.12 (2001). Access is generally
conditioned on five years of residence in the United States. See President Announces
Welfare Reform Agenda, Promising Foods Stamps for Legal Immigrants, 79 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 404, 404 (2002).
97
See Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at 30, 40; SCHUCK, supra note 81, at 166.
98
Balistreri & Van Hook, supra note 93, at 128.
99
Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at 37–40.
100
Jones-Correa, supra note 93, at 44–45.
101
See, e.g., Michael Jones-Correa, Under Two Flags: Dual Nationality in Latin
America and Its Consequences for Naturalization in the United States, 35 INT’L MIGRATION
REV. 997, 1017 (2001).
102
Building Voting Power in California for Immigration Reform, COALITION FOR
HUMANE IMMIGRANT RTS. L.A., http://www.chirla.org/node/36. Proposition 187 made
unauthorized migrants ineligible for government services like public education,
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demonstrations, participants carried signs reading “Hoy Marchamos,
103
Mañana Votamos (“Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote”). A variety
of organizations undertook naturalization and voter registration drives
104
after the marches.
Some immigrants naturalize in order to obtain the material benefits
that are exclusively available to U.S. citizens. Yet other immigrants appear
to be motivated by the social benefits that citizenship offers. Less
research has been done examining this motivation for naturalization, but
scholars have found that citizenship offers a sense of membership in the
polity, presumed belonging, social standing, and a tool for social
105
mobility. Research on immigrants’ context of reception has found that
immigrants are more likely to naturalize when they have a welcoming
106
environment. This type of environment signals that the social benefits
of citizenship are available. Van Hook, Brown, and Bean compared the
probability of different immigrants naturalizing to identify the impact of
107
The
two factors: access to welfare benefits and environment.
researchers found that the probability of naturalization was the same for
welfare recipients and non-recipients, but that individuals in locations
108
with more positive environments were more likely to naturalize. Logan,
Oh, and Darrah found a similar relationship between positive
109
A welcoming public
environments and naturalization decisions.
attitude increased the odds of naturalizing. This effect was present for
white, black, Asian, and Latino immigrants, but it increased the odds of
110
naturalization most for Latino and Asian immigrants.

healthcare, and welfare benefits. This law also required government officials to report
suspected unauthorized migrants to immigration authorities. Proposition 187, 1994
Cal. Stat. A-317, invalidated by League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997
F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
103
Ruth Milkman, Labor and the New Immigrants Rights Movement: Lessons from
California, BORDER BATTLES (Jul. 28, 2006), http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Milkman/
printable.html.
104
Id.
105
See Bloemraad, supra note 83, at 213–14; Garcia, supra note 83, at 617; Gerst &
Burr, supra note 83, at 132; Logan et al., supra note 8, at 549; Van Hook et al., supra
note 8, at 647.
106
Van Hook et al., supra note 8, at 644.
107
State-level attitudes towards immigrants and immigration were used to measure
context of reception. The researchers used a scale developed by previous researchers
based on responses on the General Social Survey from 1995 to 1997. Id. at 653.
108
Id. at 660.
109
Logan et al., supra note 8, at 549. The researchers used the existence of a
safety net for immigrants and public attitudes about immigrants to measure context
of reception. The same surveys were used to measure public attitudes as were used by
Van Hook et al. Id. at 544.
110
Id. at 549 (effect was only a 1.4% increase in the odds of naturalizing for
whites and, but 3% for Latinos, Asians, and blacks). Logan, Oh, and Darrah also
found support for instrumental reasons for naturalizing. Immigrants in states with
fewer restrictions on access to social services were less likely to naturalize. Id.
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Recent work utilizing the context of reception model provides new
opportunities to investigate the role that social benefits play in the
naturalization decision-making process. The following section explains
what constitutes an immigrant’s context of reception and the role that it
plays in immigrant incorporation.
2. Context of Reception
A context of reception approach to naturalization focuses on the
role that the structural and cultural aspects of an immigrant’s
environment play in naturalization decisions “above and beyond the role
111
played by . . . individual characteristics or motivations.” A growing
number of scholars are taking this approach to studying naturalization
112
In the area of
and broader issues of immigrant incorporation.
naturalization Irene Bloemraad has found that tangible government
support to recent immigrants positively shapes immigrants’ context of
113
reception and increases the likelihood of naturalization. Bloemraad’s
research seeks to explain why Portuguese immigrants in Canada have
significantly higher naturalization rates than Portuguese immigrants in
the United States despite having similar characteristics. Bloemraad’s
research indicates that the different levels of institutional support in
Canada and the United States explain the gap. In Canada the
government “encourage[s] citizenship through symbolic support and
114
instrumental aid to ethnic organizations and community leaders.” In
the United States, the government plays virtually no role in encouraging
noncitizens to naturalize. When the government plays an active role in
providing information to noncitizens about the benefits of naturalizing
and encourages them to do so, it results in higher naturalization rates.
Bloemraad concludes that “[i]f naturalization is lower in the United
States than in Canada, it might be less due to the type of immigrants
115
America attracts than to the welcome they are given.”
Bloemraad’s thesis has been extended to show that not only do
government efforts that motivate immigrants to naturalize matter, so do
116
other aspects of immigrants’ context. Sociologists have found that the

111

MARROW, supra note 18, at 9; PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra
note 61, at 91–102.
112
See, e.g., MARROW, supra note 18; Logan et al., supra note 8; Van Hook et al.,
supra note 8.
113
Bloemraad, supra note 83, at 213–22; see also BLOEMRAAD, supra note 8;
Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen, supra note 8; Bloemraad, Citizenship Lessons from the
Past, supra note 8.
114
Bloemraad, supra note 83, at 193, 213–22.
115
Id. at 224.
116
See Balistreri & Van Hook, supra note 93; Logan et al., supra note 8; Van Hook
et al., supra note 8, at 643, 647; see also Garcia, supra note 83 (earlier examination of
the role of social identity in decisions to naturalize). This research expands the
conversation about social contextual factors that influence naturalization decisions.
For example, previous scholars have found that social capital, residential segregation,
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more welcoming an immigrants’ context is the more likely immigrants
117
are to naturalize.
Context plays a similar role in the broader incorporation process.
Social scientists have demonstrated that immigrant incorporation is
118
context specific. Four distinct dimensions of immigrants’ context or
environment that have been studied are government policy, labor market
conditions, existing ethnic or national communities, and reactions from
119
the native population. These dimensions shape the “framework of
economic opportunities and legal options available to migrants once they
120
arrive.” It also affects the “moral resources made available by the
121
Each of these
government, employers, and the community.”
dimensions either facilitate or hinder an immigrant’s incorporation
within American society because they channel “immigrants in different
directions, often altering the link between individual skills and expected
122
rewards.” For example, welcoming immigration laws and “a viable
123
facilitate immigrants’ social and
economy with abundant jobs”
economic incorporation. Alternatively, harsh laws regulating
immigration and the lives of immigrants or a bad economy make it
difficult for immigrants to exploit the skills and motivation they have
brought with them. Absent an opportunity to use their existing skills,
immigrants risk having lower levels of educational and economic
achievement, political participation, and sense of belonging within the
124
United States.
Each dimension of an immigrant’s context or environment operates
125
For
at a national, regional, state, local, and interpersonal level.
example, the focus of this Article, immigration enforcement, operates at

and employment-based interactions with citizens help explain which immigrants
naturalize. See, e.g., Liang, supra note 88, at 431.
117
Logan et al., supra note 8, at 549; Van Hook et al., supra note 8, at 644; see
supra text accompanying notes 106–10.
118
See PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 61; see also MARROW,
supra note 18, at 233; MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ R., supra note 79, at 36–40.
119
See MARROW, supra note 18, at 233; PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA,
supra note 61, at 92–93.
120
PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 61, at 93.
121
Cecilia Menjívar, Immigrant Kinship Networks and the Impact of the Receiving
Context: Salvadorans in San Francisco in the Early 1990s, 44 SOC. PROBS. 104, 106 (1997)
(citing PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 61, at 93).
122
Cecilia Menjívar, Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives
in the United States, 111 AM. J. SOC. 999, 1002 (2006); see also PORTES & RUMBAUT,
IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 61, at 101.
123
Menjívar, supra note 122, at 1002.
124
See PORTES & RUMBAUT, LEGACIES, supra note 61.
125
MARROW, supra note 18, at 233–34; Michael Jones-Correa & Katherine
Fennelly, Immigration Enforcement and Its Effects on Latino Lives in Two Rural North
Carolina Communities, QUANTITATIVE INITIATIVE FOR POL’Y & SOC. RES., 32 (2011),
http://qipsr.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/Correa-Enforcement%20Effects%20in%
20NC%2011.02.pdf.
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a national, state, local, and interpersonal level. The federal government
establishes immigration law and policy and federal officers enforce those
laws and policies. State and local governments are increasingly enacting
laws and adopting policies that regulate the lives of immigrants and at
times implicate the enforcement of federal immigration law. The
programs addressed in Part III, such as 287(g) and state laws requiring
immigration status checks in jails, are examples of government policy
operating at the state and local level. Finally, immigration enforcement
operates at an interpersonal level. Immigrants interact with individual
police officers, sheriffs, and ICE agents. These individual interactions
126
contribute to the context that immigrants experience.
The national, regional, state, local, and interpersonal levels of an
immigrant’s context can vary, and they can contradict or complement
one another. For example, federal immigration policy could create a
neutral environment or context while state and local policy creates a
hostile environment that is reinforced by interpersonal experiences with
local law enforcement officers. Alternatively federal immigration policy
could create a hostile environment while state and local law and policy
create a positive environment that is reinforced by individual experiences
127
with law enforcement agents. Much of the recent research utilizing the
context of reception model has focused on national context. This Article
adds to the growing scholarship that focuses on the ways in which local
128
institutions contribute to immigrants’ context.
The use of minor traffic violations to ascertain immigration status in
southeastern states is an example of national, state, and local law and
policy reinforcing one another to create a hostile environment for
129
immigrants. State and local law enforcement officials implement this
specific strategy, but the federal government concurs with this approach
when ICE officials issue a detainer and institute removal proceedings
against individuals whose only criminal offense is a minor traffic offense.
As the Migration Policy Institute found in its research on 287(g)
programs, there is substantial agreement about policy priorities between
130
ICE and local law enforcement officials. The use of minor traffic

126
See Armenta, supra note 59, at 204 (describing examples of local police officers
enforcing federal immigration law and exercising discretion in ways that allowed
unauthorized migrants to regularize their status).
127
MARROW, supra note 18, at 234–35. Marrow refers to this as vertical
differentiation. In her study of Latino immigrants in rural North Carolina she found
that vertical differentiation complicated “any singular notion of what context meant
for [immigrants’] experiences in the rural South on the ground.” Id. at 235.
Sometimes the various components of the context of reception worked in concert
and at other times they were “competing cross-pressures.” Id.
128
See, e.g., MARROW, supra note 18; MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ R., supra note 79; PORTES &
RUMBAUT, LEGACIES, supra note 61; Jones-Correa & Fennelly, supra note 125.
129
See infra Part III.C.
130
CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 26.
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offenses to identify unauthorized migrants is an example of national,
state, and local policy working in concert in southeastern states.
This Article focuses on one dimension of the context that
immigrants encounter in the United States: government policy in the
131
form of immigration enforcement. Sociologists have found government
policy to be critically important in the lives of immigrants; it determines
access to the United States, legal status, and access to economic and
132
social resources. Portes and Rumbaut have described government
policies as “the first stage of the process of incorporation because it
affects the probability of successful immigration and the framework of
economic opportunities and legal options available to migrants once they
133
arrive.” Law, policy, and legal institutions determine immigrants’ legal
status, which has become a critical factor for how freely immigrants are
able to move throughout U.S. society and how they are perceived and
134
treated by the native population.
The research examining reasons for naturalizing demonstrates that
both social and material benefits matter. What is less clear is how much
each category of benefits matter and how much specific benefits within
each category matter. Are material benefits always more important than
social benefits? Are certain social benefits more important than certain
material benefits? Additional research is needed to answer these
questions and to get a better sense of the institutional and personal
factors that shape the strength or weakness of specific material and social
benefits. For example, do English language skills, length of time in the
131

Just as context can vary by levels of government, it can also vary by
institutional space. For example, the context of reception created by law enforcement
officials may differ from that created by K–12 schools or medical services agencies.
MARROW, supra note 18, at 234–36.
132
Governments can respond in three different ways to immigrants: exclusion,
passive acceptance, and active encouragement. PORTES & RUMBAUT, LEGACIES, supra
note 61, at 46. When exclusion is the basis for immigration policy individuals are
unable to gain lawful admission to the United States. Any entry to the United States is
clandestine, which leads to an underground existence once in the United States.
Passive acceptance would describe United States policy towards most family-based and
employment-based immigration. Here the government grants individuals legal access,
but makes no additional effort to facilitate immigrants’ incorporation into society. Id.
at 46–47. Unlike countries like Canada, the United States government does not
provide resettlement resources for immigrants. This type of assistance is reserved for
refugees who are granted asylum in the United States. This would be an example of
active encouragement, where the government is active in facilitating immigrants’
resettlement. Id. at 47. Active encouragement also occurs when the government plays
an active role in encouraging particular immigrant streams. An example would be the
Bracero Program that took place between 1942 and 1964. See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE
THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. 1–3 (2010).
133
PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 61, at 93.
134
Based on field work with Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants, Cecilia
Menjívar concluded that focusing on the legal aspect of immigrants’ context of
reception was appropriate because legal status “emerged as paramount in the
immigrants’ lives.” Menjívar, supra note 122, at 1003.
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United States, educational attainment, or socioeconomic status make the
social benefits of naturalization more or less important? While we don’t
have the answers to these questions yet, what we do know is that both
categories of benefits matter.
The context that immigrants encounter provides information about
the availability of both categories of benefits. The remainder of this
Article focuses on how local immigration enforcement policy shapes
immigrants’ knowledge about the social benefits of citizenship and their
expectations about the availability of such benefits.
III. SUB-FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Since 1996, an increasing number of mechanisms have become
available for state and local law enforcement officials to participate in
immigration enforcement. The primary mechanisms have been 287(g)
jail enforcement agreements, Secure Communities, and state laws
requiring jail officials to ascertain and report immigration status. It is my
contention that these mechanisms encourage the arrest of presumed
unauthorized migrants so that an immigration status check can occur.
The authority to stop and arrest an individual for minor traffic offenses
gives state and local law enforcement officials a significant amount of
135
power to indirectly ascertain immigration status. This power has been
exercised disproportionately in Latino communities. Enforcement
strategies that rely on ethnic appearance can cause Latino immigrants to
doubt that naturalization, absent a change in ethnic appearance, will
facilitate social mobility and acceptance as full members of American
136
society.
By the 1990s the federal government’s failure to control
unauthorized migration had become an issue of national concern.
California enacted Proposition 187 in 1994, which prevented
unauthorized migrants from receiving government services like public
137
education, health care, and welfare benefits. Furthermore, Proposition
135

HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
IN CONTEXT: HOW DISCRETION IS EXERCISED THROUGHOUT OUR IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 4–
5 (2012), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/
motomura_-_discretion_in_context_04112.pdf; see also Hiroshi Motomura, The
Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the
Civil–Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1842–49 (2011) [hereinafter Motomura,
The Discretion That Matters].
136
See infra Parts IV and V for further discussion of the relationship between the
use of ethnicity in immigration enforcement and perceptions about the available
benefits of naturalization.
137
Proposition 187 §§ 5–8, 1994 Cal. Stat. A-317, A-318 to A-320. Proposition 187
was permanently enjoined in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 997
F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997). The state of California initially appealed the decision,
but later withdrew its appeal and decided to have the case decided in mediation. The
mediation upheld the district court’s decision and Proposition 187 was never
enforced. CA’s Anti-Immigrant Proposition 187 Is Voided, Ending State’s Five-Year Battle
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187 required government officials to report unauthorized migrants (and
138
those presumed to be) to federal immigration authorities. While other
states did not follow suit until the 2000s, Proposition 187 was an early call
for better federal enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws. One
aspect of this call was a plea to allow state and local government officials
139
to assist the federal government in enforcing immigration law. This
plea has been heeded with the enactment of federal and state law. In
1996 Congress enacted significant immigration reform through the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
140
IIRIRA included section 287(g), which allows the
(IIRIRA).
Department of Homeland Security to deputize state and local officials to
141
enforce federal immigration law. States took action by enacting laws
requiring jail officials to ascertain the immigration status of all
individuals booked and to report noncitizens to Immigration and
142
Customs Enforcement (ICE).
Today state and local law enforcement officials participate in
immigration enforcement in two significant ways. First, they are
authorized by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to perform
the functions of an immigration officer. This is done through a 287(g)
agreement between DHS and the state or locality. Second, local law
enforcement officials exchange information with DHS for all individuals
with ACLU, Rights Groups, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (JUL. 29 1999),
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/cas-anti-immigrant-proposition-187-voidedending-states-five-year-battle-aclu-righ.
138
§§ 4, 9, 1994 Cal. Stat. at A-317 to A-318, A-320.
139
Specific authorization for state and local participation in immigration
enforcement was necessary because immigration enforcement has been deemed a
federal power. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that the immigration power is a federal power. 130 U.S. 581
(1889); 149 U.S. 698 (1893). The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly delegate the
immigration power. The only mention of immigration-related authority is Congress’
power to create a uniform naturalization law. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. To
determine which level of government, and which branch of government, was
authorized to exercise immigration authority, the Court examined the nature of the
immigration power. The Court concluded that this power was intimately connected
to foreign affairs, which is exclusively delegated to the federal government. Therefore
immigration authority lies exclusively with the federal political branches of
government. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604–09; Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711–12.
These holdings have provided the basis for decisions holding that state laws
regulating immigration are preempted by federal law. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of
Hazelton, 620 F.3d 170, 204–06 (3rd Cir. 2008), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). The
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. United States reaffirms that the federal
government has exclusive authority to regulate immigration. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
140
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
141
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
142
Arizona, Alabama, Indiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and
Virginia have all enacted such laws. See infra text accompanying notes 182–91. Certain
criminal acts make an individual deportable regardless of their immigration status. See
INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006). Reporting all noncitizen criminals to
ICE allows ICE to determine which, if any, of the noncitizens are deportable.
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arrested who were born outside of the United States. This second
approach is effectuated through state laws and Secure Communities.
A. 287(g)
287(g) is one of several programs within ICE Agreements of
Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security (ICE
ACCESS). These programs facilitate cooperation between ICE and state,
143
Additional programs
local, and tribal law enforcement agencies.
include Secure Communities and the Criminal Alien Program, which will
be addressed below. Section 287(g) of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to
enter into agreements with states and localities to have local law
144
enforcement officials enforce federal immigration law. This was a new
innovation introduced in IIRAIRA in 1996.
It was 2002 before the first agreement was entered into and few
145
additional agreements were entered into until 2007. That year 27
agreements were concluded, 30 agreements were entered into in 2008,
146
and an additional 10 in 2009 and 2010. Over half of these agreements
147
were entered into with southeastern states or localities. As noted in Part
I.A, this region experienced significant growth in the Latino population
between 1990 and 2010. The Southeast became a new destination for
large-scale Latino migration and in the first part of the twenty-first
century this region responded by seeking greater opportunities for local
immigration enforcement. 287(g) provides one option for such
enforcement.
There are two types of 287(g) agreements: jail enforcement
agreements and task force agreements. Jail enforcement agreements
authorize local law enforcement agents to ascertain an inmate’s
immigration status, “communicate with ICE about immigrants in their

143

ICE ACCESS, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/access/.
INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
145
See CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 9, 54–55. There were eight total 287(g)
agreements before 2007. Those agreements were with Florida, Alabama, Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department (California), Arizona, San Bernardino County Sheriff’s
Department (California), Orange County Sheriff’s Department (California),
Riverside County Sheriff’s Department (California), and Mecklenburg County
Sheriff’s Department (North Carolina). See id. at 54–55; FOIA Library, ICE
http://www.ice.gov/foia/library/ (collecting current and old agreements).
146
See CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 9, 54–55; Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration
Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/news/
library/factsheets/287g.htm#signed-moa (showing in-force agreements); FOIA Library,
supra note 145.
147
287(g) has grown quickly in the Southeast. The states with the most 287(g)
agreements are Virginia with nine, Arizona and North Carolina with eight, and
Arkansas and Georgia with five. Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section
287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, supra note 146; FOIA Library, supra note 145.
144
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custody, issue ICE detainers, and transfer inmates to ICE custody.” All
of this takes place within the confines of a local jail. The first official
inquiries about immigration status under a 287(g) jail enforcement
program take place once an individual has been booked into the local
149
jail. As part of the typical booking process an inmate is asked her place
of birth and nationality. When there is a 287(g) jail enforcement
agreement in place any inmate who officers believe is foreign-born, based
150
on inmate admission or other information, is screened. The screening
process entails checking DHS databases for information on immigration
151
status and interviewing the inmate to ascertain immigration status.
Once an inmate’s immigration status has been determined the officer
enters the information into ENFORCE, ICE’s database and case
management system. If the officer determines the inmate is removable
she can issue an ICE detainer, which allows the jail to hold the inmate for
up to 48 hours until he or she can be transferred to ICE for removal
152
processing. The officer can also issue a Notice to Appear (NTA), which
153
is the official charging document that initiates removal proceedings.
Pursuant to the 287(g) agreement, local law enforcement agents in jails
154
have access to DHS databases, can issue ICE detainers, and issue NTAs.
Absent a 287(g) agreement the local law enforcement agents would not
be able to engage in these activities.
Task force agreements authorize local law enforcement agents to
155
enforce federal immigration law outside of jails. For example, an
officer could enforce immigration law on a highway, in a shopping mall,
or at a workplace. These officers could approach any individual to
inquire about immigration status as long as they have reasonable
suspicion that an immigration law has been violated. Pursuant to a task
force agreement local law enforcement agents are authorized to inquire
about immigration status, access DHS databases, and issue ICE detainers
and NTAs just like officers with a jail enforcement agreement. Local
officers with a task force agreement have the additional authority to
“issue arrest warrants for immigration violations and execute search
156
warrants.” The majority of the 287(g) agreements currently in force are
148

CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 14.
Id.; see also Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C. Legal Found. & Immigration &
Human Rights Pol’y Clinic, The Policies and Politics of Local Immigration Enforcement
Laws, ACLU N.C., 23 (Feb. 2009), http://www.acluofnorthcarolina.org/files/
287gpolicyreview_0.pdf.
150
CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 14.
151
Id. at 13. Questions used to ascertain immigration status include Where were
you born?, When and where did you first enter the United States?, and Did you enter
with or without authorization? Id.
152
Id. at 13, 16 fig.1.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 13.
155
Id. at 15.
156
Id.
149
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157

jail enforcement or hybrid agreements. Pursuant to a hybrid agreement
both jail enforcement and task force activities take place within one
158
jurisdiction.
287(g) jail enforcement agreements facilitate the use of minor
criminal offenses as a tool for reducing the unauthorized migrant
population. While patrol officers are not deputized to enforce
immigration law, the deputized officers at the jail can check the
immigration status of any individual the patrol officer arrests and books
into jail. Patrol officers can use offenses like having a broken tail light,
improper stop, or failing to dim headlights as a pretext for determining
immigration status. This is the allegation that has been made in
159
numerous southeastern states where 287(g) agreements are operating.
B. Secure Communities
160

Similar concerns exist about Secure Communities. Unlike 287(g)
agreements, Secure Communities does not involve deputizing local law
enforcement agents to enforce immigration law. This program uses
biometric information collected by local law enforcement agents to
identify noncitizens with criminal convictions. All individuals booked into
jail have their fingerprints taken. Traditionally those fingerprints are

157

Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and
Nationality Act, supra note 146.
158
CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 15. Fewer jurisdictions have local law
enforcement agents deputized to enforce federal immigration law outside of jails.
159
See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUND. OF GA., THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL
PROFILING IN GWINNETT: TIME FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND AN END TO
287(G), at 5, 10–11 (2010), available at http://www.acluga.org/download_file/
view_inline/1504/260/ [hereinafter ACLU GWINNETT]; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUND. OF GA., TERROR & ISOLATION IN COBB: HOW UNCHECKED POLICE POWER UNDER
287(G) HAS TORN FAMILIES APART AND THREATENED PUBLIC SAFETY 9–16 (2009),
available at http://www.acluga.org/download_file/view_inline/1505/260/ [hereinafter
ACLU COBB]; A. ELENA LACAYO, NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 21, THE
IMPACT OF SECTION 287(G) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT ON THE LATINO
COMMUNITY (2010), available at http://www.nclr.org/images/uploads/publications/
287gReportFinal.pdf; SARAH WHITE & SALMUN KAZEROUNIAN, TENN. IMMIGRANT &
REFUGEE RIGHTS COAL., THE FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTION: RACIAL PROFILING AND
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN BEDFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE 6 (2011), available at
http://www.tnimmigrant.org/storage/The%20Forgotten%20Constitution.pdf.
160
One aspect of the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) raises similar concerns as
well. CAP works to identify, process, and remove noncitizens convicted of crimes who
are incarcerated in federal, state, and local jails and prisons. The program was
created so that ICE could obtain custody of these individuals before they are released
to the general public. The jail and prisons component of CAP assigns ICE agents to
certain federal, state, and local jails and prisons. The ICE agents perform the same
functions as local law enforcement officials acting pursuant to a 287(g) jail
enforcement agreement. Criminal Alien Program, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/criminalalien-program/. Thus for jails and prisons that have ICE agents assigned to them,
local law enforcement agents are aware that arresting an individual that will be
booked at one of these facilities will commence an immigration investigation.
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shared with the FBI, and the FBI runs them through the Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), a fingerprint and
criminal history database. Pursuant to the Secure Communities program
the same fingerprints are also sent to the Department of Homeland
Security. DHS runs the fingerprints through the Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT). IDENT is a database containing
biometric-based immigration records. This includes records for
individuals who have applied for a visa, been granted a visa, been
admitted to the United States, or been removed from the United States.
161
IDENT identifies any individual with an immigration record. While
IDENT identifies individuals with immigration records, it does not
identify individuals who entered the United States without inspection
and have evaded contact with immigration authorities.
If there is a hit on IDENT an Immigration Alien Query is sent to the
ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC). LESC sends its report to
the local ICE Enforcement and Removal Office and that office
determines whether or not to issue a detainer. A detainer authorizes a jail
to hold the individual for an additional 48 hours so that ICE can retrieve
162
them to begin removal proceedings.
A predecessor to Secure Communities is the Criminal Alien Program
(CAP). In this program local jail officials hold noncitizens until an ICE
official can screen the individual and ascertain their immigration
163
status. After ICE conducts its review it determines whether or not to
164
issue a detainer. Unlike the 287(g) program, local law enforcement
officers acting pursuant to Secure Communities and CAP are not
deputized ICE agents—they do not have access to DHS databases to
ascertain immigration status, and they do not have the authority to issue
165
an ICE detainer or an NTA. Federal immigration officials conduct
these activities. Local enforcement officials only make federal officials
aware of specific noncitizens.
The vast majority of individuals removed pursuant to Secure
Communities have been individuals convicted of Level one, two, or three

161
See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
SECURE COMMUNITIES STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 3 (2009), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesops93009.pdf;
Secure Communities, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/.
162
See 8 U.S.C. § 287(d); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 161, at 4. In
responding to an Immigration Alien Query LESC provides information on the
individual’s immigration status. Id.
163
TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE,
ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN THE ICE CRIMINAL
ALIEN PROGRAM 1 (2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_
irving_FINAL.pdf.
164
Id.
165
See id. at 2.
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166

Yet less than half of those removed, 45%, were
offenses—75%.
167
individuals convicted of Level one or two offenses. Level one offenses
include drug trafficking, national security crimes, murder, manslaughter,
168
rape, robbery, kidnapping, and other violent crimes. Level two offenses
169
are minor drug and property offenses. Examples include burglary,
170
Level three is all other
larceny, fraud, and money laundering.
171
offenses.
These numbers support the main critique that has been raised about
Secure Communities—it is not being used to identify and deport the
most serious noncitizen criminals. ICE states that it “prioritizes the
removal of criminal aliens, those who pose a threat to public safety, and
172
Immigrant advocates, think tanks,
repeat immigration violators.”
academics, and government officials have questioned ICE’s adherence to
this policy. As of August 2011 Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York have
173
tried to pull out of Secure Communities. They contend that DHS
misrepresented the program to them by stating that it would be used to
identify and deport serious criminals when in fact it has been used to
identify and deport unauthorized migrants who are crime victims,
174
witnesses, and those with minor criminal convictions.
The data support the conclusion that the majority of the individuals
deported as a result of Secure Communities are convicted criminals. But
they are not the serious threats to public safety and national security that
is the stated goal of the program. Less than half of those deported have
175
been convicted of Level one or two offenses. Twenty-five percent were
deported based on immigration violations such being a fugitive,

166
IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability Monthly Statistics Through August 31, 2012, ICE, 2
(2012), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide_interop_stats-fy2012-todate.pdf. Between its inception in October 2008 and August 2012, only 11,390
individuals who entered without inspection or violated the terms of their visa have
been identified and removed as a result of Secure Communities. This represents
roughly 5% of those removed pursuant to the program. See id.
167
Id. Only 28% were convicted of Level one offenses. Id.
168
Template for Memorandum of Agreement, ICE, 2 (July 31, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesmoatemplate.pdf.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 3.
172
Secure Communities, supra note 161.
173
Chip Mitchell, States May Have to Readopt Deportation Program, NPR (Aug.
18, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/18/139725801/states-may-have-to-re-adoptdeportation-program.
174
Id.; Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to Obama’s Immigration Strategy,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2011, at A18; Press Release, N.Y. Governor Andrew M. Cuomo,
Governor Cuomo Suspends Participation in Federal Secure Communities Program
(June 1, 2001), available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/06012011Federal
SecureCommunitiesProgram.
175
IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability Monthly Statistics Through August 31, 2012, supra
note 166, at 2.
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176

overstaying a visa, or entering without inspection. Secure Communities
has been an effective tool in increasing the number of noncitizens
deported. Yet a number of states, particularly in the Southeast, want
more enforcement and have enacted their own laws to facilitate greater
immigration enforcement.
C. State Laws
State laws to address immigration enforcement have focused on
requiring jailers to ascertain the immigration status of foreign-born
177
Arizona, Alabama, Indiana, North
individuals booked into jail.
178
Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Virginia have all enacted such laws.
Tennessee requires that jailers verify the citizenship status of all
individuals arrested, booked, or confined for any period of time in a
county or municipal jail or detention facility. Officers are also required to
report individuals who may be in violation of federal immigration law to
179
the appropriate ICE field office. Alabama’s June 2011 immigration law
requires that any noncitizen “who is arrested and booked into custody
shall have his or her immigration status determined” and verified by
180
contacting the federal government. Additionally when a state, county,
or municipal law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion that an
individual encountered during a lawful stop, detention, or arrest is
unlawfully present in the United States, the officer is required to make a
reasonable attempt to determine the individual’s citizenship and
181
immigration status. North Carolina law requires any county or local jail
to verify the immigration status of individuals detained on a felony or
182
impaired driving charge. Virginia requires the same of any individual
183
booked into any jail. In Prince William County, Virginia General Order
45 required Prince William County police officers to inquire about the
176

Id.
Additional states have also required other government officials to ascertain
and/or report immigration status. For example, Alabama requires school officials
and healthcare professionals to ascertain immigration status. ALA. CODE § 31-13-7
(LexisNexis 2011); id. § 31-13-27, invalidated by Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v.
Governor of Ala., 691 F.3d 1236, 1244–49 (“In short, we do not find these
justifications . . . substantial enough to justify the significant interference with the
children’s right to education under Plyler[ v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)]. We therefore
conclude that [§ 31-13-27] violates the Equal Protection Clause.”).
178
ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(b) (LexisNexis 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3906
(2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-1-2 (LexisNexis 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-62
(2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 530.1 (West Supp. 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7123 (Supp. 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-83.2 (2008).
179
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-123.
180
ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(b).
181
Id. § 31-13-12(a). Alabama’s law mirrors that of Arizona’s SB 1070 enacted in
spring 2010. See Arizona S.B. 1070, § 2, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, 451, amended by H.B.
2162, § 3, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070, 1073.
182
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-62.
183
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-83.2.
177
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citizenship or immigration status of persons lawfully detained for a
184
violation of state or local law. Officers did not have to arrest an
individual in order to ascertain their immigration status; lawful detention
was sufficient. This order was modified in July 2008 such that inquiring
185
into immigration status is no longer mandatory.
Pursuant to these state and local laws, local law enforcement officers
are not deputized as federal immigration officials; they simply request
information regarding immigration status from the Department of
186
Homeland Security. These laws are an effort to facilitate cooperation
187
between federal, state, and local law enforcement officials.
Regardless of the authority upon which local law enforcement
officers are seeking immigration status information, the information is
being gathered upon arrest and booking. Thus, whether a state or
locality has a 287(g) agreement, participates in Secure Communities, or
has state law requiring jail officials to ascertain immigration status, local
law enforcement officials are playing an important role in immigration
enforcement. Local law enforcement officials have a great deal of power
in deciding whose immigration status will be checked because of the
power and discretion they have to arrest. Officers know that an arrest,
any arrest, will begin a process in which immigration status information
will be gathered. For those who are interested in reducing the
unauthorized migrant population within their jurisdiction arrests for
minor traffic offenses are an easy way to check the immigration status of
large portions of the population. The disproportionate use of this
enforcement strategy in Latino communities has caused Latino
188
immigrants to feel targeted based on their ethnicity. These experiences
can cause Latino immigrants to conclude that naturalization may not
provide the social mobility and acceptance as a full member of society

184

THOMAS M. GUTERBOCK ET AL., EVALUATION STUDY OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
POLICE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICY: INTERIM REPORT 2009, at 18
(2009), available at http://www.pwcgov.org/government/dept/police/Documents/
10636.pdf.
185
Id. at 18–19.
186
Local law enforcement officers seeking immigration status information submit
a request to the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center located in Vermont. Law
Enforcement Support Center, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/lesc/.
187
Arizona’s law providing for such cooperation was the subject of the Supreme
Court’s 2012 decision in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). The federal
government argued that Arizona was preempted from enacting a law requiring local
law enforcement officials to ascertain the immigration status of individuals lawfully
stopped, detained, or arrested. Id. at 2507–08. The legal challenge was filed before
the law went into force and lower courts had enjoined the law. Id. at 2498. The
Supreme Court concluded that it was too early to determine whether federal law
preempted Arizona’s law. Id. In theory it was possible that the law could operate
without conflicting with or obstructing the federal law. The Court noted that there
may be additional constitutional problems with the state provision after it comes into
force, but the Court was not willing to make predictions. Id. at 2507–10.
188
See infra Part IV.C.2.
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that it provides for other naturalized citizens. As long as they appear
Latino, law enforcement officials, and others, will perceive them as
189
foreign and unauthorized.
IV. ENFORCEMENT THROUGH TRAFFIC STOPS
Within the Southeast, traffic offenses have become the predominant
means of identifying deportable noncitizens pursuant to 287(g)
agreements. In this Part, I contend that traffic stops for minor traffic
violations are being used as a pretext to ascertain immigration status.
This immigration enforcement strategy is used disproportionately in
Latino communities and creates a hostile environment, which can shape
Latino immigrants’ expectations regarding naturalization and social
mobility.
Thirty percent of all ICE detainers issued nationwide in 2010
190
pursuant to 287(g) agreements were based on traffic offenses. Half of
191
these cases came out of southeastern states. Of the traffic-based
detainers issued throughout the country, 90% were pursuant to a jail
enforcement agreement, 9% pursuant to a hybrid agreement, and less
192
than 1% were based on a task force agreement. The southeastern
193
figures are the same. These numbers suggest that the police officers
responsible for the most traffic-based arrests leading to ICE detainers
were patrol officers with no specific authority or mandate to enforce
immigration law. Patrol officers do not need 287(g) authority to support

189

See infra Part IV for further discussion about the perceived foreignness of
Latinos in the United States.
190
See CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 58–59. ICE data tracked traffic offenses separately
from other offenses until June 2010. Regardless of how serious the traffic offense was it
was tracked in the separate category of traffic offenses. Traffic offenses could include
driving without a license or having a broken tail light, in addition to more serious
offenses like vehicular homicide or driving under the influence. ICE’s priorities indicate
that Level one and two offenders are “serious criminals,” while Level three and traffic
offenders are not. Based on ICE’s prioritization, I treat the traffic offenses as not serious
offenses. Id. at 18 n.54. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between Immigration &
Customs Enforcement of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec. and Maricopa Cnty.
Sheriff’s Office 17 (Oct. 26, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/
memorandumsofAgreementUnderstanding/r_287gmaricopacountyso102609.pdf
[hereinafter Maricopa 287(g) Agreement]; Memorandum of Agreement Between Immigration
& Customs Enforcement of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec. and Pima Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t 17 (Oct.
15, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/memorandumsofAgreementUnderstanding/
r_287gpimacounty101509.pdf [hereinafter Pima 287(g) Agreement].
191
The Migration Policy Institute has noted that the ten sites with the largest
share of detainers for traffic violations were in the Southeast. CAPPS ET AL., supra note
7, at 2, 58–59.
192
See id. at 58–59. The ten jurisdictions with the highest number of traffic-based
detainers had jail enforcement agreements. Id.; Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration
Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, supra note 146.
193
CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 58–59.
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immigration enforcement; they just need to operate within a jurisdiction
in which the immigration status of all arrested individuals is checked.
A. Discretion
287(g), Secure Communities, and state law requiring immigration
status checks of all individuals booked into jail are powerful tools for
local law enforcement agents interested in reducing the number of
unauthorized migrants living within their jurisdiction. Patrol officers
have a significant amount of discretion to decide whom to arrest and
194
This discretion allows local law enforcement officials to
detain.
determine whose immigration status will be checked.
1. Enforcement Priorities
Jail enforcement agreements identify priorities for arrest and
detention, but local law enforcement agents are not prohibited from
195
pursuing low priority noncitizens. The agreements only state that
“[r]esources should be prioritized” in accordance with the enforcement
196
priorities. The highest priority is Level one criminal aliens, followed by
Level two, and Level three. Level one includes “[a]liens who have been
convicted of or arrested for major drug offenses and/or violent offenses
197
such as murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, and kidnapping.” Level
two is “[a]liens who have been convicted of or arrested for minor drug
offenses and/or mainly property offenses such as burglary, larceny,
198
fraud, and money laundering.” Level three is noncitizens “who have
199
been convicted of or arrested for other offenses.” Nothing in the
287(g) agreement prohibits local law enforcement officers from using
the program to identify unauthorized migrants through traffic violations.
Statistics from southeastern states indicate that these priorities are
not being operationalized. In southeastern states operating with 287(g)
jail or hybrid enforcement agreements 38.2% of detainers issued were
200
based on Level two and Level three offenses. Level one offenses only
201
accounted for 15.4% of detainers issued.
ICE retains supervisory authority over local law enforcement officers
202
operating pursuant to 287(g). The failure of ICE officials to discourage

194

MOTOMURA, supra note 135, at 4–5; see also Motomura, The Discretion That
Matters, supra note 135, at 1829, 1842–49.
195
See, e.g., Maricopa 287(g) Agreement, supra, note 190, at 17; Pima 287(g)
Agreement, supra, note 190, at 17.
196
Maricopa 287(g) Agreement, supra, note 190, at 17.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 58–59.
201
Id. The remaining detainers were based on traffic offenses, other offenses, or
no offenses, which are recorded separately. Id.
202
See, e.g., Maricopa 287(g) Agreement, supra note 190, at 6.
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traffic offense-based arrests suggests that this approach is acceptable to
ICE. The Migration Policy Institute found that there was significant
203
In
agreement between ICE supervisors and local jurisdictions.
jurisdictions like Cobb County, where there is a high number of traffic
offense-based arrests, ICE supervisors reported that “ICE and the 287(g)
jurisdictions together have sufficient resources to detain and remove all
unauthorized immigrants identified by 287(g) officers, regardless of the
204
severity of the criminal offenses.” These supervisors also contended that
traffic violations represented “a public safety threat significant enough to
205
warrant removal.” This sentiment is shared by various local jurisdictions
206
that seek to apprehend as many unauthorized migrants as possible. The
Davidson County Sheriff’s office in Tennessee contends that “processing
207
misdemeanors makes the Nashville community safer.” This conclusion
is based on data that “75 percent of vehicular homicides by illegal aliens
would have been prevented if their previous misdemeanor arrests had led
208
to deportation.” Sheriffs in Frederick, Cobb, and Gwinnett counties
expressed similar sentiments. Charles Jenkins, the Sheriff in Frederick
County, Maryland, testified before Congress that “the enormous increase
in crime in the United States . . . can be tied directly to the unchecked
209
flow of illegal immigrants through our southern border with Mexico.”
The Cobb County Sheriff’s Office website states, “If someone is here
illegally and commits a crime, whether a misdemeanor or a felony, they
210
should be subject to deportation.” Gwinnett County Sheriff Butch
Conway contends that unlicensed drivers are a public safety threat:
“Those people that haven’t shown a proficiency in driving, I think they
211
are dangerous out on the road.”
In jurisdictions where ICE supervisors take a different position, there
are fewer traffic offense-based arrests. For example, ICE supervisors in
Prince William County, Maryland have steered officers toward Level one
212
and Level two offenders and away from traffic offenses. In Prince
William County, the ICE supervisors see civil immigration enforcement as
an important, but secondary priority. The first priority is gangs, drugs,
203

CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 25.
Id. at 26.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 10.
207
DAVIDSON CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, supra note 38, at 14.
208
Id.
209
Examining 287(g): The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement in Immigration Law:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. 20 (2010) (statement of
Charles A. Jenkins, Sheriff, Frederick Cnty., Md.).
210
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Frequently Asked Questions, COBB
CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.cobbsheriff.org/news/08-0112%20%20287%28g%29%20Frequently%20Asked%20Questions%20and%20Stats.htm.
211
Andria Simmons, Is Sheriff a Hero or Racial Profiler?, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct.
12, 2009, at A1.
212
CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 25.
204
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smuggling, and national security threats rather than generally identifying
213
unauthorized migrants.
Regional ICE offices play an important role in determining local law
enforcement’s priorities in immigration enforcement. In numerous
jurisdictions, the supervisory ICE officials appear to have concluded that
214
they have the resources to pursue Level three noncitizens. As a result,
traffic stops have become an important immigration enforcement tool.
2. Citation or Custodial Arrest?
In jurisdictions where identifying unauthorized migrants is viewed as
an appropriate goal for 287(g) programs, the significant discretion that
local law enforcement officers have to stop and arrest an individual is an
215
asset. The manner in which this discretion is exercised has led to
critiques that law enforcement agents are using traffic offenses and other
misdemeanors as a pretext for ascertaining immigration status. Driving
without a license is a traffic violation, but officers have the discretion to
either issue a citation or arrest an individual who does not have a driver’s
license. Tennessee has a “cite and release” statute. Law enforcement
officers are required to issue a citation for driving without a license, but
are allowed to arrest an individual and take him into custody if there is a
“reasonable likelihood that the offense would continue,” a “reasonable
likelihood . . . that the arrested person will fail to appear in court,” or
“[t]he person arrested cannot or will not offer satisfactory evidence of
216
identification.” North Carolina, Virginia, and Georgia have similar “cite
213

Id.
But see Tom Smith, ‘Our Hands Are Tied’: Officers Frustrated with Lack of Federal
Support on Immigration Law, TIMESDAILY.COM, (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.timesdaily.com/
stories/Our-hands-are-tied,186911 (reporting that the ICE office in Huntsville,
Alabama is only willing to issue detainers for individuals identified by local law
enforcement officials if they have a felony charge).
215
See, e.g., MOTOMURA, supra note 135, at 4–5; Motomura, The Discretion That
Matters, supra note 135, at 1842–49.
216
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-118 (2006); see NASHVILLE METRO. POLICE DEP’T,
GENERAL ORDER NO. 05-14, STATE MISDEMEANOR ARREST CITATIONS 2–3 (June 22,
2005), available at http://www.tnimmigrant.org/storage/misc/Metro_PD_Policy_on_
Arrests._vs_Citations%206-2008.pdf. The Nashville Metropolitan Police Department
internal policy states that officers shall issue citations for state misdemeanor offenses
when the “officer has reasonable proof of the identity of the suspected
misdemeanant.” Id. at 1. Alternatively when the individual arrested “cannot or will
not offer satisfactory evidence of identification” the officer is prohibited from issuing
a citation and must physically arrest the individual. Id. at 2–3. What forms of
identification are considered valid has been an issue in Tennessee. Nashville Police
Department’s internal policy states that photo identifications like government,
employee, military, or school identification are preferred. Id. at 4. Other acceptable,
but less desirable, forms of identification include computer verified information,
vehicle registrations and titles, government food or housing documents, voter
registration cards, club/fraternal/service organization membership cards, social
security cards, birth certificates, jail identification, parole/probation documents, and
rent or utility receipts. Id. Identification documents from an immigrant’s country of
origin have not always been accepted as satisfactory identification. For example,
214
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217

and release” statues. In Virginia, officers are allowed to arrest a driver if
the officer reasonably believes the driver will disregard the summons or
218
will cause harm to himself or another person. Georgia has been
concerned about unauthorized migrants driving without driver’s licenses
and enacted harsher penalties to address driving without a license. State
law requires that an individual guilty of driving without a license be
219
fingerprinted and imprisoned for two days to twelve months. A fine
220
between $500 and $1,000 can also be imposed.
The discretion that officers exercise in deciding whether to issue a
citation or arrest a driver determines whether or not a driver’s
immigration status will be checked. This discretion bolsters the role that
patrol officers without 287(g) task force authority can play in
immigration enforcement. Officers who exercise that discretion in ways
Juana Villegas was stopped for a traffic violation. Julia Preston, Immigrant, Pregnant,
Is Jailed Under Pact, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, at A13. Juana did not have a
driver’s license, but provided a valid consular identification card, which contains a
photo. 287(g) in Tennessee, TENN. IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE RTS. COAL.,
http://www.tnimmigrant.org/287g. The officer did not accept this as valid
identification, allegedly stating that he believed that she was “illegal,” and he arrested
her. Id.; Preston, supra. Juana Villegas was also nine months pregnant and gave birth
with sheriff’s officers standing guard at her hospital bed where her feet were
frequently cuffed to the bed. Preston, supra. When consular identification cards and
other forms of identification are accepted as satisfactory identification unauthorized
migrants avoid a custodial arrest and the mandatory immigration status check that
accompanies a custodial arrest.
217
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-35 (2011) (driving without a license is a Class 2
misdemeanor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-302 (authorizing the issuance of a citation for
misdemeanors); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401 (authorizing an officer to arrest without a
warrant if the officer has probable cause that an offense was committed in her
presence); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74.A.1 (2008) (requiring officer to issue a summons
for Class 1 and 2 misdemeanors and release the detained individual); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 46.2-300 (2010) (first offense of driving without a license is a Class 2 misdemeanor,
second offense is a Class 1 misdemeanor); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20 (2008) (general
arrest authority), GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-23 (authority to issue a citation for motor
vehicle violations in lieu of custodial arrest); Brock v. State, 396 S.E.2d 785, 786 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-23(a) retains officer’s ability to
effectuate a custodial arrest when a citation is allowed). In a case involving a driver
with a Mexican driver’s license who failed to maintain his lane, the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that the officer was within his statutory discretion to arrest the driver for
failure to maintain his lane. Lopez v. State, 650 S.E.2d 430, 432–33 (Ga. Ct. App.
2007). While the driver, Lopez, had a valid Mexican driver’s license he could not
provide his Georgia residential address. The Court concluded that the decision to
arrest under these circumstances was not an abuse of the officer’s discretion. Id. at 433.
218
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74.A.1. Georgia statute does not provide guidelines or
criteria regarding when a custodial arrest is allowed or appropriate. North Carolina
statute only provides such guidelines for misdemeanors that do not occur in the
presence of an officer. In those instances an arrest is allowed if the individual will not
be apprehended immediately unless arrested or the individual may cause injury to
himself or others or damage property unless arrested. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A401(b)(2)(b).
219
GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-121 (2011).
220
Id.
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that target Latino communities perpetuate the idea that Latinos are
foreigners in the United States regardless of their birthplace or
citizenship status.
B. Pretext
Whether a state or local jurisdiction has a 287(g) agreement,
participates in Secure Communities, the Criminal Alien Program, or has
a state law requiring jailers to ascertain immigration status, law
enforcement officials can use minor traffic offenses as a pretext for
ascertaining immigration status. With an increasing number of states
requiring individuals to prove lawful residence in the United States to
obtain a driver’s license, traffic offenses have become an important
221
immigration enforcement tool. Once stopped for a traffic offense the
inability to provide a driver’s license or adequate identification allows a
patrol officer to arrest the driver. Residents of Latino communities
believe that they are subject to extra patrols in which they are stopped “to
verify they are wearing a seatbelt that is visibly fastened, for driving less
222
than 5 mph over the speed limit, or for no reason at all.” Statistics from
223
certain jurisdictions support this perception.
In localities such as Bedford County, Tennessee, residents contend
that they encounter roadblocks and extra patrols in Latino communities
224
and near Latino grocery stores and markets. At the roadblocks, vehicles
were stopped to check for driver’s licenses and identification. Since these
checks occurred at roadblocks, the law enforcement officers did not have
225
to identify a specific traffic violation before approaching the vehicle.
Decisions to place numerous roadblocks in Latino communities are
perceived by members of these communities as an indication that law
enforcement officials believe individuals within these communities are
likely to be unauthorized migrants. Such actions perpetuate the idea that
those of Latino descent are foreigners and unauthorized.
These stops allow law enforcement officers to check for a driver’s
license and arrest the driver if she is unable to produce one. Once
arrested, the immigration status check begins at the jail. Since these
patrol officers are not operating pursuant to a 287(g) task force
agreement, they have no authority to stop an individual to inquire about
221
Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The Future of
Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213 (2004).
222
WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 6.
223
See infra text accompanying notes 234–40.
224
WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 6; see also ACLU COBB, supra note 159,
at 110–11 (reporting similar incidents); ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159, at 16 (same).
225
It is unclear what the nature of the roadblocks at issue were, but police
officers can conduct administrative searches such as sobriety or border checkpoints
without having individualized suspicion of unlawful activity. See Eve Brensike Primus,
Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 255 (2011); see also
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562, 566 (1976).
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their immigration status. Traffic violations provide a legitimate basis for
patrol officers to stop an individual and potentially arrest him, at which
point an immigration status determination will be made at the jail.
The significant number of traffic offenses and misdemeanors
underlying ICE detainers in recent years suggests that law enforcement
officials rely on pretextual traffic stops to identify deportable noncitizens.
In Irving, Texas, which participates in the Criminal Alien Program, 98%
of the individuals arrested and detained by ICE had been “charged with
226
misdemeanor offenses.” Thirty percent of the ICE detainers issued
227
pursuant to 287(g) agreements in 2010 were based on traffic offenses.
Yet, in certain southeastern jurisdictions, traffic offenses account for over
228
half of all ICE detainers issued in 2010. For example, in Cobb County,
229
Georgia 67% of the ICE detainers issued were due to a traffic offense.
The figure for Davidson County in Tennessee was 57%, and it was 52% in
230
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina.
In numerous jurisdictions throughout the Southeast minor traffic
offenses are being used to identify unauthorized migrants. The targeted
use of this enforcement strategy in Latino communities leaves its
residents with the impression that they are being targeted. The
perception of targeting contributes to a hostile environment. Drivers are
not being stopped because a broken tail light is a public safety threat, but
because the officer wants to check the driver’s immigration status.
Enforcement strategies that alienate Latinos based on their ethnicity and
presumed immigration status negatively shape Latino immigrants’
perceptions about their possible social mobility within U.S. society.
C. Racial Profiling
The U.S. Department of Justice has defined “racial profiling” as
the invidious use of race or ethnicity as a criterion in conducting
stops, searches and other law enforcement investigative procedures.
It is premised on the erroneous assumption that any particular
individual of one race or ethnicity is more likely to engage in
misconduct than any particular individual of another race or
231
ethnicity.

226

GARDNER & KOHLI, supra note 163, at 2. Within the same time period the
Irving police arrested significantly higher numbers of Latinos for Class-C
misdemeanors than they did African Americans or Whites. Id. at 5 & fig.1. Class-C
misdemeanors are the least serious group of misdemeanors. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 12.03 (West 2011).
227
See supra note 190.
228
CAPPS ET AL., supra note 7, at 58–59.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE
BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1 (2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/
crt/about/spl/documents/guidance_on_race.pdf; see also DEBORAH RAMIREZ ET AL., A
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Many individuals within Latino communities in the Southeast believe
that Latinos are stopped for minor traffic violations so that the officers
can ascertain the driver’s immigration status. Recent data analyzed by the
Warren Institute at Berkeley Law School and the Department of Justice
232
supports the existence of racial profiling in Arizona and nationwide.
The Warren Institute has found that since the inception of Secure
Communities, 93% of the individuals identified for deportation through
233
Secure Communities have been Latinos. Even if the majority of
individuals identified for deportation are unauthorized migrants, in 2010
Latinos only accounted for approximately 78% of the unauthorized
234
migrant population. The Department of Justice has concluded that the
Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) engaged in pervasive and
systematic racial profiling. MCSO participated in Secure Communities
and had 287(g) jail enforcement and task force agreements until
235
Based on a statistical analysis of the MCSO’s
December 2011.
immigration enforcement program, Latino drivers were four to nine
times more likely to be subject to a traffic stop than similarly situated

RESOURCE GUIDE ON RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS: PROMISING
PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED 3 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/bja/184768.pdf (defining “racial profiling” as “any police-initiated action
that relies on the race, ethnicity, or national origin rather than the behavior of an
individual or information that leads the police to a particular individual who has
been identified as being, or having been, engaged in criminal activity.”).
232
The Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) has critiqued the methodology of
this report. See, e.g., W.D. Reasoner & Jessica Vaughan, Secure Communities by the
Numbers, Revisited: Analyzing the Analysis (Part 2 of 3), CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Mar.
2012), http://www.cis.org/articles/2012/reasoner-vaughan-secure-communities-PART2.pdf. CIS contends that the Warren Institute should not have assumed that all
individuals from Latin American countries are Latinos. Using the same methodology
CIS found that 92.6% of those identified for deportation were Latino. Id. at 4. CIS
seeks to distinguish non-mestizo Amerindians from Spanish-speaking Latinos. While
these are important distinctions to make within Latin American country populations,
in the United States these groups tend to be grouped together as Latino. The broad
application of this term has been critiqued as grouping dissimilar individuals together
based on country of origin, yet this practice has persisted. See, e.g., MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ
R., supra note 79. Current usage of the term Latino in the United States seriously
undermines this aspect of CIS’ critique.
233
AARTI KOHLI ET AL., SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 5–6 (2011), available at http://www.law.berkeley.
edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf.
234
HOEFER ET AL., supra note 26, at 4.
235
The Department of Homeland Security did not renew Maricopa County
Sheriff’s Office’s 287(g) task force agreement in 2009; it terminated the office’s
287(g) jail enforcement agreement in December 2011 and restricted the office’s
access to Secure Communities in December 2011. Randal C. Archibold, Immigration
Hard-Liner Has His Wings Clipped, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, at A14; Press Release, Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Napolitano on DOJ’s Findings of Discriminatory
Policing in Maricopa County, (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/
12/15/secretary-napolitano-dojs-findings-discriminatory-policing-maricopa-county; see
also Editorial, The Case Against Sheriff Arpaio, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, at A24.
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236

non-Latino drivers. The expert conducting the statistical analysis noted
that this was “the most egregious racial profiling in the United States that
he has ever personally seen in the course of his work, observed in
237
litigation, or reviewed in professional literature.” Additionally the DOJ
found that the MCSO’s Human Smuggling Unit stopped, detained,
238
and/or arrested Latino drivers without adequate cause. Approximately
20% of the traffic-related incident reports from this unit “contained
information indicating that the stops, almost all of which involved Latino
drivers, were conducted without reasonable suspicion or probable
239
cause.”
The use of racial profiling creates a hostile environment because
240
Latino immigrants feel harassed, disrespected, and unwelcome. This
enforcement strategy legitimates law enforcement agents seeing Latinos
as potential “illegal immigrants” rather than lawful residents or citizens
because of their ethnic appearance. These types of pretextual traffic
stops perpetuate the idea that Latino appearance is linked to
241
foreignness. The long-term consequence of this enforcement strategy is
to leave Latino immigrants with the impression that naturalization will
not provide the same opportunities for social mobility that it provides to
other immigrants because they will always be perceived as foreign and
possibly “illegal.” While racial profiling has generally been condemned as
a legitimate police practice, its legal status in immigration enforcement is
less clear. The following sections provide an analysis of the jurisprudence
that supports the use of pretextual traffic stops to enforce immigration
law and examples of racial profiling as an immigration enforcement
strategy.
1. Legal Support for Racial Profiling
While the United States Supreme Court has not endorsed racial
profiling in the immigration context, it has given immigration
enforcement officers a great deal of latitude in using ethnicity to
establish reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence in the United States.
There are few legal checks to constrain immigration enforcement
officers’ use of ethnicity to identify unauthorized migrants. The legal

236
Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Ass’t. Atty. Gen. of the U.S., Civil Rights Div.,
U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Atty. for Maricopa Cnty., Ariz. 6 (Dec.
15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso_
findletter_12-15-11.pdf.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
See, e.g., WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 6; ACLU COBB, supra note
159; ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159; LACAYO, supra note 159.
241
See JIMÉNEZ, supra note 79, at 140–41; MIA TUAN, FOREVER FOREIGNERS OR
HONORARY WHITES?: THE ASIAN ETHNIC EXPERIENCE TODAY 250 (1998); Fatma E.
Marouf, Regrouping America: Immigration Policies and the Reduction of Prejudice, 15 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 129, 157–63 (2012).
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system’s failure to provide sufficient checks exacerbates the hostile
environment in which Latino immigrants live.
In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court held that pretextual stops do not
violate the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Whren the Court
decided that probable cause that a traffic violation is occurring is a per se
242
justification for a stop. Once it is determined that an officer has
probable cause to make the traffic stop the Fourth Amendment inquiry is
243
over. If officers use minor traffic violations as a pretext to determine if
a driver has a driver’s license or has violated other traffic laws like
wearing a seatbelt there is no Fourth Amendment problem unless there
244
was no probable cause for the initial stop. The significant amount of
discretion that officers have to make traffic stops means that
considerations such as race could “seep into the [probable cause]
245
calculus.” The Supreme Court has acknowledged this possibility and
contends that the Equal Protection Clause provides the basis for
246
addressing concerns about racial profiling. In the immigration context
few legal protections exist to combat racial profiling.
In 1975, the Court held that “Mexican appearance” is a relevant,
although insufficient, factor giving rise to probable cause that an
247
individual is unlawfully present in the United States. The Immigration
and Naturalization Act empowers immigration enforcement officers to
“interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to
248
be or to remain in the United States.” In United States v. Brignoni249
Ponce, the Court applied the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion
standard to Border Patrol stops. The Court held that the Border Patrol is
only authorized to stop individuals “if they are aware of specific
articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that
reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be

242

517 U.S. 806 (1996).
Janet Koven Levit, Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the Death
of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 145, 165 (1996).
244
Anecdotal information suggests that probable cause may not exist in a
number of traffic stops involving Latino drivers. Latino drivers in Tennessee and
Georgia have reported being pulled over and not told the reason for the stop. After
the drivers provide a driver’s license they are released. ACLU COBB, supra note 159;
ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159; WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159. To the
extent these types of stops are occurring, the Fourth Amendment rights of the drivers
are being violated. ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159, at 18. In such cases the drivers
believe that they have been stopped because of their Latino appearance. ACLU COBB,
supra note 159, at 9–11; ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159, at 12, 16.
245
Levit, supra note 243, at 167.
246
Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
247
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975).
248
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 287(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1)
(2006).
249
422 U.S. 873.
243
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250

illegally in the country.” “Mexican appearance” alone does not create
reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence. The Court noted that “[l]arge
numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the physical
characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry, and even in the border
251
area a relatively small portion of them are aliens.” Yet the Court
concluded that “Mexican appearance” is a relevant factor because the
“likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is
252
high.”
Despite the incongruence of these statements, current law allows
immigration enforcement officers to consider ethnicity as a factor in
establishing reasonable suspicion regarding immigration status. Ethnicity
is one of many factors that officers can consider because “Mexican
appearance” alone “does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to
253
ask if they are aliens.” Some of the other factors include “characteristics
254
of the area in which [the officers] encounter a vehicle,” “the driver’s
255
256
behavior,” “[a]spects of the vehicle,” and “characteristic appearance
of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as the mode of
257
dress and haircut.”
The Court’s conclusion regarding the relevance of “Mexican
appearance” was based on the government’s estimate that 85% of
unauthorized migrants in the United States at the time were from

250
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884. The Court had earlier held that probable
cause was needed for Border Patrol officers to search vehicles at a fixed checkpoint
or pursuant to a roving-patrol search. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975)
(fixed checkpoints); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (roving
patrols). In 1976 the Court distinguished between searches and stops in which an
individual is asked about their immigration status. In the latter situation, Border
Patrol officers do not need individualized suspicion to stop and question an
individual at a fixed checkpoint. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562
(1976). Even if the stop is based “largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry”
the Court “perceive[d] no constitutional violation.” Id. at 563. Brignoni-Ponce’s
requirement of individualized reasonable suspicion for stops pursuant to a rovingpatrol survived Martinez-Fuerte. The Court specifically noted that criteria sustaining the
stop and questioning in Martinez-Fuerte “would not sustain a roving-patrol stop.” Id.
251
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886.
252
Id. at 886–87.
253
Id. at 887.
254
Id. at 884.
255
Id. at 885. Examples of “[t]he driver’s behavior” include driving erratically or
obviously attempting to evade officers. Id.
256
Id. “Aspects of the vehicle” includes factors such as “certain station wagons,
with large compartments for fold-down seats or spare tires,” a “heavily loaded”
appearance, a large number of passengers, or if the officers notice individuals trying
to hide. Id.
257
Id.; see also Chacón, supra note 11, at 145–46; Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal
Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 70–72
(2010); Johnson, supra note 30, at 1024.
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258

Mexico. It is doubtful that these numbers were correct. The 1981 final
report of the U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy
stated, “Mexican nationals probably account for less than half of the
259
In 2010, the Department of
undocumented/illegal population.”
Homeland Security estimated that Mexican nationals account for 61% of
260
the unauthorized migrant population. While the Mexican percentage
of the unauthorized migrant population has increased since 1975, the
majority of individuals in the United States of Mexican ancestry are U.S.
citizens or lawfully present migrants.
In 2010, approximately 78% of the unauthorized migrants in the
United States were from Mexico, Central America, and South America.
Based on these types of statistics, the Supreme Court and others
conclude that it is more likely that a Latino is an unauthorized migrant.
Yet the overwhelming majority of Latinos in the United States are U.S.
citizens or lawfully present migrants. Available statistics suggest that
83.5% of the Latino population in the United States is within these
261
categories. Approximately 74% of the Latino population are U.S.
262
citizens, either by birth or naturalization, and 9.5% are lawful migrants.
Based on the logic offered by the U.S. Supreme Court, lower courts, and
law enforcement officials, that ethnicity is a relevant factor in identifying
unauthorized migrants, being an African-American is probative of being
an NBA player. The majority of NBA players are African-American;
therefore being African-American is relevant in determining if a specific
individual is an NBA player. Since the majority of African-Americans are
not NBA players, race does not provide particularly useful information
regarding NBA player status. Factors such as height and athletic ability
are much more probative. Similarly, Mexican appearance is being used as
a factor for ascertaining immigration status when other factors are much
more probative.
The Ninth Circuit agreed and held that “Hispanic appearance,” even
when considered with other factors, does not assist in establishing
263
reasonable suspicion of being unlawfully present. In United States v.
Montero-Camargo the court acknowledged Brignoni-Ponce’s statement on
258

Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 694 (2000).
259
SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POL’Y, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 36 (1981), reprinted in H. AND S. COMMS. ON THE JUDICIARY,
97TH CONG., JOINT COMM. PRINT NO. 8 (1981). This statement was based on data from
the U.S. Census Bureau. Johnson, supra note 258, at 695 & n.96.
260
HOEFER ET AL., supra note 26, at 4.
261
Id.; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates:
Sex by Age by Citizenship Status (Hispanic or Latino), AMERICAN FACTFINDER (2010),
http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/10_1YR/B05003I.
262
HOEFER ET AL., supra note 26, at 4; U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 260. Lawful
migrants includes individuals present pursuant to both immigrant and nonimmigrant
visas.
263
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000).
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the matter but held that the Supreme Court’s decision was based on
264
“outdated demographic information.” At the time the Ninth Circuit
issued its decision, the Latino population throughout the country had
grown tremendously such that Latinos were a majority or substantial part
of the population in many parts of the country, particularly those near
265
Based on this demographic information, the court
the border.
concluded that the likelihood that anyone of “Hispanic ancestry is in fact
an alien, let alone an illegal alien, is not high enough to make Hispanic
266
appearance a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.” The
court emphasized the need for individualized suspicion and concluded
that “Hispanic appearance is of little or no use in determining which
particular individuals among the vast Hispanic populace should be
267
stopped by law enforcement officials on the lookout for illegal aliens.”
This approach has not been adopted outside of the Ninth Circuit.
The Supreme Court’s tolerance for the use of ethnicity in
establishing reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence reinforces the
idea that ethnicity is a marker of foreignness and immigration status.
Approval of the connection between ethnicity, foreignness, and
immigration status undermines the idea that the social benefits of
citizenship are equally available to all.
2. Racial Profiling in Practice
The continued use of Latino appearance as a factor in determining
who is unlawfully present in the United States disproportionately burdens
one segment of the population, the majority of whom are U.S. citizens or
268
lawful immigrants. As the Latino population in the United States has
grown more diverse, the relevance of “Mexican appearance” has been
269
As with the Mexican ancestry
expanded to Latino appearance.
population, the majority of the Latino population in the United States is
270
comprised of U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants. Yet the perception of
foreignness continues to attach to Latino ethnicity. Research by social
psychologists demonstrates “‘a very consistent and robust’ association

264

Id. at 1132.
Id. at 1133.
266
Id. at 1132.
267
Id. at 1134.
268
Justice Brennan raised a similar concern in his dissent in Martinez-Fuerte. He
noted that the Court’s decision authorized the Border Patrol to “target motorists of
Mexican appearance. The process will then inescapably discriminate against citizens
of Mexican ancestry and Mexican aliens lawfully in this country for no other reason
than that they unavoidably possess the same ‘suspicious’ physical and grooming
characteristics of illegal Mexican aliens.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 572 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
269
Johnson, supra note 258, at 698.
270
SETH MOTEL & EILEEN PATTEN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE 10 LARGEST HISPANIC
ORIGIN GROUPS: CHARACTERISTICS, RANKINGS, TOP COUNTIES 10 (2012),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/06/The-10-Largest-Hispanic-Origin-Groups.pdf.
265
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271

between American identity and Whiteness.” A study of Caucasian
Americans and Latino Americans found that both groups explicitly and
implicitly saw Latino Americans as less American than Caucasian
272
Other studies have found similar results for Asian
Americans.
273
The scholars involved in this
Americans and African Americans.
research conclude that the research findings suggest that “a very basic
right to a national identity is not equally available to all Americans,”
because “national identity is more readily granted to members of the
274
dominant ethnic group than to members of an ethnic minority.” For
Latinos in the United States, this can mean being perceived as a
noncitizen rather than a citizen.
In 2008, the Pew Hispanic Center reported that approximately 9% of
Latino adults in the United States (native-born, U.S. citizens, and
immigrants) had been asked about their immigration status by a police
275
officer or other government official in the last year. Citizens have even
been apprehended by ICE and held for questioning. The Warren
Institute found that 1.6% of individuals apprehended by ICE pursuant to
276
Despite naturalizing and
Secure Communities were U.S. citizens.
becoming U.S. citizens, some Latino citizens are subject to apprehension
by ICE because local law enforcement agents target them and ICE
277
databases are incomplete. Knowledge that one can be arrested and
subsequently detained by ICE despite being a U.S. citizen suggests that
naturalization will not provide a presumption of belonging or preclude

271
Marouf, supra note 241, at 157 (quoting Theirry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
American = White?, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 447, 463 (2005)).
272
Thierry Devos et al., Say “Adios” to the American Dream? The Interplay Between
Ethnic and National Identity Among Latino and Caucasian Americans, 16 CULTURAL
DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 37 (2010).
273
Marouf, supra note 241, at 157–58 (citing studies).
274
Devos et al., supra note 272, at 47; see also JIMÉNEZ, supra note 79, at 160; TUAN,
supra note 241, at 18.
275
MARK HUGO LOPEZ & SUSAN MINUSHKIN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., 2008 NATIONAL
SURVEY OF LATINOS: HISPANICS SEE THEIR SITUATION IN THE U.S. DETERIORATING;
OPPOSE KEY IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT MEASURES 9 (2008), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/93.pdf. The rate was higher for Latinos 18 to
29 years old—15%—and significantly lower for those over age 55—4%. Id. The
figures dropped to 5% of Latino adults in the United States in 2010, however, the
figure for Latino men was 8%. MARK HUGO LOPEZ ET AL., PEW HISPANIC CTR., ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION BACKLASH WORRIES, DIVIDES LATINOS 12 (2010), available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/128.pdf.
276
KOHLI ET AL., supra note 233, at 4. ICE Director John Morton responded to
this information by stating that “[i]t would be irresponsible for us not to investigate
someone who is suspected of a crime and has some record of being foreign born.”
Julia Preston, Latinos Said to Bear Weight of a Deportation Program, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
2011, at A16. See also supra note 232.
277
See, e.g., Julia Preston, Immigration Crackdown Also Snares Americans, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2011, at A20.
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278

one from ICE’s jurisdiction. Denial of these benefits of citizenship may
cause some Latino immigrants to conclude that the benefits of
279
naturalization do not outweigh the costs.
Latino residents of Bedford County in Tennessee feel that regardless
of immigration status one is “marked out if you have dark skin, hair, or if
280
you speak English with [an] accent.” In Alabama it has been alleged
that 58% of the vehicle searches done by one specific state trooper were
conducted with Latino motorists, even though Latinos account for only
281
2% of Alabama’s population. In Shelbyville, Tennessee, public records
indicate that the local police department arrested a disproportionate
number of Latino drivers for traffic violations in the first quarter of
282
2011. Thirty-five percent of those arrested were Latino, even though
283
Latinos only make up approximately 20% of Shelbyville’s population.
As has been reported in other jurisdictions, it appears that a few officers
284
made the majority of the arrests of Latino drivers. Four officers were
285
responsible for 62% of the arrests of Latino drivers for traffic violations.
Shelbyville officers are not assigned a specific area to patrol, but rather
patrol throughout the city. This suggests “that some officers may be
intentionally targeting Latino drivers for traffic stops and arrests, perhaps
286
in order to facilitate detention by ICE.”

278
ICE only has jurisdiction over noncitizens. See Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006).
279
The costs associated with naturalization include time, money, and a potential
risk of being deported. The filing fee for a naturalization application is $595 plus an
$85.00 biometric fee. 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.7(b)(1)(i)(C), 103.7(b)(1)(i)(XX) (2012).
Applicants frequently pay for English classes and classes on U.S. history and civics.
MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION FEE INCREASES IN CONTEXT 1 (2007), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FS15_CitizenshipFees2007.pdf. Other costs
include photographs and hiring an attorney to prepare the application. Id. Time is
spent gathering the necessary information for the application and putting it together.
A potential risk is involved because one of the naturalization requirements is being a
person of good moral character. If during the process of reviewing the application
the government concludes that an individual does not have good moral character
due to a criminal conviction, the applicant may be eligible for deportation. Now the
applicant is facing deportation proceedings rather than a naturalization ceremony.
See Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for U.S. Citizenship, 87
IND. L.J. 1571 (2012); Anthony Lewis, Op-Ed., Rays of Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001,
at A15 (describing how this happened to Mary Anne Gerhis).
280
WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 6.
281
Daniel C. Vock, Police Join Feds to Tackle Immigration, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Nov.
27, 2007), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/police-join-fedsto-tackle-immigration-85899386665.
282
WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 6.
283
Id. Latinos also accounted for 39% of the arrests for driving license violations. Id.
284
Id.
285
Id. at 7.
286
Id.
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Latino drivers report being stopped frequently for minor traffic
287
violations or being stopped without probable cause of wrongdoing. For
example, in Georgia individuals report being pulled over for crossing the
white line, expired registration, improper or incomplete stop at a stop
288
sign, and failing to dim headlights. The officers’ conduct during traffic
stops has given some drivers pause as to whether the stop was a pretext to
ascertain immigration status. For example, Gabriel was ticketed for an
improper stop at a stop sign. Gabriel had been extra careful to make a
full and complete stop at the intersection because he knew this was an
289
area frequented by county police officers. The officers did not tell
Gabriel the reason for the stop, but they issued him a ticket for an
290
improper stop and arrested him for driving without a driver’s license.
Gabriel noticed several cars passed through the stop sign without making
a complete stop before he was pulled over. None of those cars were
stopped by the police officers and Gabriel thinks that the fact that the
individuals in those vehicles appeared Caucasian was relevant in the
291
officer’s decision to leave them alone. Similarly, Rogerio was stopped
for driving on a closed road in a residential area. Before the police
officer asked for a driver’s license, he asked Rogerio about his
immigration status, whether he had an alien registration card, visa, or
292
passport. Another example involves a Tennessee Highway Patrol State
Trooper who pulled over a Latino driver for speeding. The driver
immediately showed the officer his valid driver’s license and proof of
insurance. At this point the officer asked for the driver’s green card. The
driver inquired about the officer’s authority to investigate immigration
status, to which the officer “demanded proof of his citizenship, stating
293
that he ‘knew’ the driver ‘was an illegal.’” The driver was issued a
citation for driving without a license, no proof of insurance, and no
seatbelt, even though the driver had provided a license, evidence of
294
insurance, and was visibly wearing a seatbelt.
Latino drivers also report being pulled over for reasons that are not
clear and then given a citation or arrested for traffic violations such as
driving without a license. Other drivers are not arrested or issued a
295
citation, but they are never provided with an explanation for the stop.
287
Organizations such as the ACLU, the National Council of La Raza, and the
Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition have documented allegations of
racial profiling in southeastern states related to local immigration enforcement.
ACLU COBB, supra note 159, at 9–13; ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159, at 10–16;
LACAYO, supra note 159, at 13–19; WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 6–7.
288
ACLU COBB, supra note 159, at 9–13; ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159, at 14.
289
ACLU COBB, supra note 159, at 10–11.
290
Id.
291
Id.
292
Id. at 12.
293
WHITE & KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 7.
294
Id.
295
ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159, at 10–11.

LCB_16_4_Art_2_Banks.docx (Do Not Delete)

1/9/2013 9:02 PM

2012] “SELF-DEPORTATION” POLICIES & NATURALIZATION

1197

For example, a Gwinnett County sheriff pulled Juan over as he was
leaving work. Juan asked the officer several times why he had been
stopped. The officer never answered Juan, but requested his driver’s
296
license and “screamed at him for asking questions.” Juan produced a
valid driver’s license and was subsequently released. The officer never
297
issued Juan a citation or explained the reason for the stop.
While these examples may be written off as mere anecdotes, they
represent a perception that exists amongst many Latino immigrants—
that they are targeted for immigration enforcement because of their
298
ethnicity. The Homeland Security Task Force on Secure Communities
acknowledged the importance of this perception and recommended that
ICE withhold enforcement action for individuals identified through
299
Secure Communities based on a minor traffic offense. The Task Force
noted that such a policy would “reduce the risk of racial profiling or
other distortions of standard arrest practices followed by arresting or
300
correctional officers.”
The perception of racial profiling not only contributes to a hostile
environment, it “could very well cast a shadow on the brightness of the
301
American Dream.” More specifically, it suggests that the social mobility
benefits of citizenship may not be equally available. Sociologists Massey
and Sánchez R. found that while Latino immigrants see the United States
302
as a land of opportunity, they also see it as a place of great inequality.
Their perceptions of inequality were based on “the high degree of
prejudice in the United States against minorities, the poor, and those
303
who do not speak English.” The targeting of those with a Latino
appearance for immigration status checks also perpetuates the idea that
Latinos are foreigners. Ethnic appearance is visible in a way that
citizenship status is not. The benefits of presumed belonging and
membership within the polity that generally attach to citizenship are
unavailable as long as one’s appearance suggests that one is a foreigner.
These perceptions of the United States not only contribute to a hostile
environment, but also imply that naturalization may not facilitate social
mobility.
296

Id. at 5.
Id.
298
ACLU COBB, supra note 159; ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159; KOHLI ET AL.,
supra note 233, at 6; LACAYO, supra note 159, at 6; Rights Working Grp., Faces of
Racial Profiling: A Report from Communities Across America 5–7 (2010), available at
http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/sites/default/files/ReportText.pdf; WHITE &
KAZEROUNIAN, supra note 159, at 6–7.
299
TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMTYS., HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 22 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
hsac-task-force-on-secure-communities-findings-and-recommendations-report.pdf.
300
Id.
301
MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ R., supra note 79, at 124.
302
Id.
303
Id.
297
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V. DECIDING TO NATURALIZE
Citizenship is often viewed as the ultimate sign of successful
304
incorporation into U.S. society. Many have heard people tell stories
about their older relatives who eagerly awaited the opportunity to
naturalize because it signaled becoming American. They were anxious to
claim this identity and so they naturalized at the first available moment.
This perception of naturalization has been challenged by the idea of
defensive, instrumental, or protective naturalization that was discussed in
Part II. Pursuant to this conception of naturalization, immigrants become
305
citizens to reap the material benefits of citizenship. This Article uses
the growing research on the social benefits of naturalization to offer an
additional perspective on the relationship between naturalization and
incorporation. Rather than seeing the decision to naturalize as a rational
calculation of material costs and benefits, naturalization can also be
understood as a statement about immigrants’ sense of acceptance and
opportunity for mobility within the United States. Exploring these
aspects of naturalization opens up a wider range of policy options to
encourage naturalization. It also provides a basis for evaluating existing
immigrant- and immigration-related policy.
This Part contends that the social and material benefits of citizenship
matter in naturalization decisions, and that immigrants’ environment
provides insight on the relationship between naturalization, perceived
belonging, and social mobility. The use of minor traffic violations to
ascertain immigration status contributes to a hostile environment by
perpetuating the idea that Latinos are foreigners and likely “illegal
306
Repeated experiences with this message suggest that
aliens.”
naturalization will do little to increase Latino immigrants’ perceived
307
belonging and opportunities for social mobility in the United States.

304

Naturalization is often discussed as “a signifier of assimilation.” Gilbertson &
Singer, supra note 86, at 26 (citing Smith, supra note 86, at 197). This conception of
naturalization “corresponds to a national model of citizenship which sees immigrants
as incorporating as citizens of a single nation-state. According to this view, immigrants
shed their ‘traditional’ way of life and integrate into the social, cultural and political
life of the receiving society while severing ties to the origin country. . . . This
perspective suggests that immigrants become full members of the host society and
that the logical end point of the integration of immigrants into the receiving society
is single nation-state citizenship.” Id. (citations omitted).
305
See, e.g., BORJAS, The Impact of Welfare Reform, supra note 93, at 9; Balistreri &
Van Hook, supra note 93; Borjas, Welfare Reform and Immigrant Participation, supra note
93, at 1094; Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86, at 30, 44; Jones-Correa, supra note 93,
at 41; Ong, supra note 93; Adrian D. Pantoja et al., Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity:
Patterns in Political Mobilization by Naturalized Latinos, 54 POL. RES. Q. 729, 730 (2001).
306
Marouf, supra note 241, at 132–33 (noting “persistent association between
American identity and Whiteness”).
307
See Jiménez, supra note 79, at 140–41 Tuan, supra note 241, at 18; T. Alexander
Aleinikoff & Rubén G. Rumbaut, Terms of Belonging: Are Models of Membership SelfFulfilling Prophecies?, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 24 (1998).
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A. Variation in Naturalization Rates
Since 1990 a greater portion of immigrants eligible to naturalize are
doing so, but the rate for Mexicans is disproportionately low. In 1990,
308
37% of the lawfully present foreign-born population had naturalized.
309
By 2005 the percentage had increased to 52%. This increase has been
attributed to a larger number of eligible immigrants and a greater
310
Yet these
likelihood that those eligible will seek citizenship.
naturalization rates are not even across countries of origin. For example,
Mexican immigrants accounted for 35% of immigrants eligible to
naturalize in 2005 yet only accounted for 13% of immigrants who
311
naturalized that year. Asian immigrants who constituted 19% of eligible
312
immigrants made up 39% of the immigrants who naturalized in 2005.
Central Americans’ rates are closer to that of Mexicans. In 2005, Central
Americans accounted for 8% of eligible immigrants but only 5% of
313
immigrants who naturalized that year. A similar trend is noticeable
314
since 1995.

308

PASSEL, supra note 24, at i.
Id.
310
Id. See also Balistreri & Van Hook, supra note 93, at 114.
311
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2005 YEARBOOK
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 53, 55 (2006); PASSEL, supra note 24, at 27.
312
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 311, at 53 (showing percent who
naturalized); PASSEL, supra note 24, at 27 (showing percent eligible).
313
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 311, at 53–55 (showing number
naturalized from Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
and Panama); PASSEL, supra note 24, at 27 (showing percent eligible).
314
PASSEL, supra note 24, at 27. In 2000, Mexico, Ecuador, Honduras, El Salvador,
and Guatemala each had below average naturalization rates ranging from 29.1%–
44.3%. PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 61, at 145 (percentage of
each immigrant group that are naturalized citizens).
309
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TABLE 3. Mexican Immigrant Naturalization Rates
YEAR

PERCENT OF LPRS ELIGIBLE PERCENT OF INDIVIDUALS
TO NATURALIZE

NATURALIZED

2010

32.2

10.8

2009

32.7

15.0

2008

33.3

22.2

2007

33.7

18.5

2006

32.1

12.0

2005

35.2

12.8

2004

29.8

11.9

The trend of disproportionately low naturalization rates for Mexican
immigrants has continued, although it has reversed somewhat for Central
316
American immigrants since 2007. The enactment of the Nicaraguan
317
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) in 1997 may
help to explain the increase in Central American naturalization rates.
NACARA made it easier for certain Central American and Eastern
European nationals to adjust their status to LPR and relaxed the
318
Congress’
standards for discretionary relief from deportation.
enactment of NACARA can be seen as neutralizing a negative
environment for Central American immigrants. By providing increased
access to LPR status, Central American migrants were given an explicit
message of welcome.
The disproportionately low naturalization rates for Mexican
immigrants have been an issue of interest for immigration scholars
because they suggest that Mexican immigrants are less incorporated in
319
the United States than other immigrants. Lower naturalization rates
mean that a smaller percentage of Mexican immigrants have the full
bundle of legal rights and social benefits of citizenship.
Scholars have offered a variety of explanations for the differences in
naturalization rates. These explanations have focused on the individual
315

OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 53, 55; RYTINA, supra note
13, at 4; NANCY RYTINA, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2009, at 4 (2010); NANCY
RYTINA, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF
THE LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2008, at 4 (2009); NANCY RYTINA,
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2007, at 4 (2009); NANCY RYTINA, OFFICE OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2006, at 4 (2008); NANCY F. RYTINA, OFFICE OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION AND POPULATION ELIGIBLE TO NATURALIZE IN 2004, at
4 (2006); PASSEL, supra note 24, at 27.
316
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 53–55.
317
Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2193 (1997).
318
Gabrielle M. Buckley, Immigration and Nationality, 32 INT’L LAW. 471, 480 (1998).
319
See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 81, at 168–70; JACOBSON, supra note 82, at 65.
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skills and resources of the immigrant, regulatory or bureaucratic barriers
to naturalization, the relative costs and benefits of naturalizing, and more
320
recently, immigrants’ context or environment. This section contends
that immigrants’ context provides valuable information about the
availability of the social benefits of citizenship. The literature evaluating
the costs and benefits of naturalizing has focused on the material benefits
of citizenship. Insufficient attention has been given to the role that the
social benefits of citizenship play in individual decisions to naturalize.
The context that immigrants encounter not only explicitly or implicitly
encourages naturalization; it also provides important information about
the likelihood of social mobility and being perceived as a member of
society. A context in which nativity, foreignness, and immigration status
are closely connected to ethnicity can lead immigrants to conclude that a
change in citizenship status absent a change in ethnicity will do little to
increase their perception of belonging or opportunities for social
mobility.
The cost–benefit theory of naturalization posits that noncitizens do
not naturalize because they do not see the benefits of U.S. citizenship
outweighing the costs. There are two variations of this argument. First,
citizenship offers few benefits that are not already available to green card
321
holders so there is no incentive to naturalize. Second, citizenship does
offer unique benefits, but immigrants are unaware of them. Once
322
immigrants become aware of the citizenship benefits, they naturalize.
One of the most significant costs of becoming a United States citizen can
be losing citizenship in one’s home country. Citizenship in many
countries around the world is required to own property or participate in
society in other significant ways. If these states do not recognize dual
citizenship, becoming a United States citizen can mean losing important

320
Bloemraad, Citizenship Lessons from the Past, supra note 8, at 928; see also Jasso &
Rosenzweig, supra note 82, at 116–21; MICHAEL JONES-CORREA, BETWEEN TWO NATIONS:
THE POLITICAL PREDICAMENT OF LATINOS IN NEW YORK CITY (1998); SCHUCK, supra note
81, at 169–70; Robert R. Alvarez, A Profile of the Citizenship Process Among Hispanics in the
United States, 21 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 327–28 (1987); Bloemraad, supra note 8; Peggy
Levitt & Nina Glick Schiller, Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field
Perspective on Society, 38 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 1002, 1024–26 (2004); Louis DeSipio,
Building America, One Person at a Time: Naturalization and the Political Behavior of the
Naturalized in Contemporary American Politics, in E PLURIBUS UNUM?: CONTEMPORARY AND
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON IMMIGRANT POLITICAL INCORPORATION 67–106 (Gary
Gerstle & John Mollenkopf eds., 2001); David S. North, The Long Grey Welcome: A Study
of the American Naturalization Program, 21 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 311 (1987); Alejandro
Portes & Rafael Mozo, The Political Adaptation Process of Cubans and Other Ethnic
Minorities in the United States: A Preliminary Analysis, 19 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 35, 46
(1985); Carole J. Uhlaner et al., Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s,
11 POL. BEHAV. 195 (1989); Yang, supra note 88, at 474.
321
See, e.g., JACOBSON, supra note 82, at 40, 65; SCHUCK, supra note 81, at 168–70;
YASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL
MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE 123–24 (1994).
322
Van Hook et al., supra note 8, at 647.

LCB_16_4_Art_2_Banks.docx (Do Not Delete)

1202

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

1/9/2013 9:02 PM

[Vol. 16:4

323

rights in the home country. Countries like El Salvador have recognized
dual citizenship since 1983, but Mexico, the Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, and Brazil only began to recognize dual citizenship in the
324
mid- to late-1990s. Bolivia, Chile, and Honduras have only done so
325
since 2004, 2005, and 2003, respectively. While this was a significant
cost historically, today Mexican immigrants and numerous Central
American and South American immigrants no longer face this cost.
This section focuses on the second version of the cost–benefit thesis
because of the significant social and material benefits that are uniquely
available to citizens. For example, only citizens who are seen as full
members of society can vote in state and federal elections, can sponsor a
broader range of relatives for immigrant status, have access to certain
social welfare benefits, and have an absolutely secure right to enter and
remain in the United States. Research examining the role of immigrants’
environment on naturalization decisions provides new insights into the
cost–benefit analysis of immigrants’ naturalization decisions.
B. Context of Reception & Naturalization Decisions
The social science research on naturalization indicates that both the
social and material benefits of citizenship are important factors in
naturalization decisions. So, while access to voting rights, employment
opportunities, the ability to freely enter the United States, and greater
ability to sponsor relatives for green cards influence naturalization
326
decisions, so does a welcoming environment. The disproportionate use
of traffic stops to ascertain immigration status in Latino communities
perpetuates the idea that Latinos are foreigners in the United States
327
regardless of their birthplace or citizenship status. This suggests that
fewer of the social benefits of naturalization will be available. The court
decisions permitting the use of ethnicity to establish suspicion of
unauthorized immigration status without sufficient oversight for abuse
perpetuates the idea that Latinos are foreigners.

323
See Cristina Escobar, Extraterritorial Political Rights and Dual Citizenship in Latin
America, 42 LATIN AM. RES. REV., Oct. 2007, at 41, 50–51; Gilbertson & Singer, supra
note 86, at 30.
324
Escobar, supra note 323, at 51; Michael Jones-Correa, Under Two Flags: Dual
Nationality in Latin America and Its Consequences for Naturalization in the United States, 35
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 997, 999 (2001).
325
Escobar, supra note 323, at 51.
326
Gilbertson & Singer, supra note 86; Logan et al., supra note 8, at 549; Van
Hook et al., supra note 8, at 660.
327
See Chacón, supra note 11; Johnson, supra note 258, at 694–95; Stephen H.
Legomsky, The Ethnic and Religious Profiling of Noncitizens: National Security and
International Human Rights, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161, 178 (2005); Mary Romero
& Marwah Serag, Violation of Latino Civil Rights Resulting from INS and Local Police’s Use
of Race, Culture and Class Profiling: The Case of the Chandler Roundup in Arizona, 52 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 75.
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The burden of proving lawful presence is not felt equally by all
immigrants, or by immigrants alone. The use of minor traffic offenses as
a basis for ascertaining immigration status appears to be used
328
disproportionately in Latino communities. In 2008 the Pew Hispanic
Center reported that approximately 9% of adult Latinos, citizens and
immigrants alike, had been stopped by the police or other authorities
329
and asked about their immigration status in the past year. The rates
330
were similar for native-born Latinos and foreign-born Latinos. Eight
percent of native-born Latinos compared to 10% of foreign-born Latinos
331
had been stopped for an immigration status inquiry.
Citizenship status does not protect Latinos from the burden of
proving that they are lawfully present in the United States. Four U.S.
citizens have been detained in Los Angeles County, California pursuant
332
to Secure Communities. The individuals were arrested for criminal
offenses and detained additional days pursuant to ICE detainers. For
example, Antonio Montejano was arrested and charged with petty theft.
Mr. Montejano was holiday shopping with his four children when his
333
youngest daughter begged for a ten dollar bottle of cologne. Mr.
Montejano said he “inadvertently dropped it into a bag of things he had
334
already bought. As he left the store, he was arrested.” He had no
criminal record so he expected to post bail quickly. Mr. Montejano had
his driver’s license and other legal identification, but because of an
immigration detainer he was denied bail and held after the criminal case
335
concluded. He was held for two days before he saw a judge on the
criminal case. At that time he pleaded guilty, the fine was waived, and “he
336
was ordered released.” Mr. Montejano was held for an additional two
nights on the immigration detainer. He repeatedly told officers that he
337
was an American citizen, but to no avail. Once his lawyers sent ICE his
338
U.S. passport and birth certificate he was released. Mr. Montejano
concluded that the police did not believe him when he told them he was
339
an American citizen because “I look Mexican one hundred percent.”
328
See, e.g., ACLU COBB, supra note 159; ACLU GWINNETT, supra note 159;
LACAYO, supra note 159; White & Kazerounian, supra note 159.
329
LOPEZ & MINUSHKIN, supra note 275, at 9. See supra note 275 for 2010 figures.
330
Id.
331
Id.
332
Paloma Esquivel, Immigration Enforcement Snares Citizens, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2011, (LATExtra) at 3.
333
Preston, supra note 277.
334
Id.
335
Id.
336
Esquivel, supra note 332.
337
Id.
338
Preston, supra note 277.
339
Id. ICE issued a detainer for Mr. Montejano because immigration officials had
failed to recognize his citizenship in the past and incorrectly deported him to Mexico
in 1996. His records within the DHS database had not been corrected. Id.
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Romy Campos found herself in a similar situation when she was
340
arrested on a minor misdemeanor charge. She was denied bail and
341
transferred to a Los Angeles County jail pursuant to an ICE detainer.
Her public defender told her there was nothing he could do to lift the
detainer. Ms. Campos did not understand why ICE could not “see in my
342
file or something that I’m a citizen.” She was released after an
American Civil Liberties Union lawyer provided ICE with her Florida
343
birth certificate. The experience left her feeling “misused completely, I
344
felt nonimportant, I just felt violated by my own country.”
The fact that individuals appear to be Latino is relevant for an
immigration stop and inquiry. In Brignoni-Ponce the U.S. Supreme Court
held that “Mexican appearance” is a relevant factor in establishing
345
reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence. While the Court held that
“Mexican appearance” alone is insufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion, the Court’s jurisprudence provides very little judicial
346
Individuals and
monitoring of immigration enforcement officials.
organizations within Latino communities believe that ethnicity is the only
basis for the pretextual stops and few jurisdictions have allayed these
347
concerns.
The use of ethnicity, exclusively or primarily, as a basis for
establishing reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence reinforces the
idea that those with a Latino appearance are foreign, and likely to be
unauthorized migrants. This use of ethnicity suggests that citizenship
provides little protection from the negative attitudes and police
encounters that Latino immigrants experience as immigrants. The
concern that citizenship will provide insufficient protection against ICE
immigration inquiries tracks the notion of second-class citizenship within
the United States. Legal scholars have long noted that the rights
340

Id.
Id.
342
Id.
343
Id.
344
Id. Ms. Campos is a citizen of the United States and Spain and had a
Department of Homeland Security record because she once entered the United
States on her Spanish passport. Id. An additional example comes from Alabama.
Sixty-six U.S. citizens have been imprisoned in Alabama pursuant to the Beason–
Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2011. Moises Naim,
Alabama Immigration Law Ensnares People You Wouldn’t Expect, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 17,
2011), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/17/alabama-immigration-lawensnares-people-you-wouldn-t-expect.html. The individuals were imprisoned for not
having papers with them establishing that they were legal residents of the United
States. Id. Half of these individuals were black. Id.
345
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975).
346
Johnson, supra note 258, at 694–96 (discussing cases).
347
See, e.g., DAVIDSON CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, supra note 38, at 11, 13; Sheriff
Conway’s Rebuttal to ACLU on Racial Profiling, GWINNET COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFF.,
http://www.gwinnettcountysheriff.com/index.php/287g/sheriff-conways-rebuttal; see
also supra text accompanying notes 267–96.
341

LCB_16_4_Art_2_Banks.docx (Do Not Delete)

1/9/2013 9:02 PM

2012] “SELF-DEPORTATION” POLICIES & NATURALIZATION

1205

associated with citizenship are often experienced differently based on
factors such as race, ethnicity, gender, social class, and sexual
348
orientation. Despite the grant of formal citizenship within the United
States certain groups have “remained excluded and marginalized in
349
The second-class citizenship critique
many significant respects.”
contends that “the extension of the formal status of citizenship alone can
350
mask real oppression and thereby represents a largely empty husk.”
Given the history of second-class citizenship in the United States, there is
little guarantee that formal citizenship status will be an effective shield
against the negative attitudes and police encounters that some Latino
immigrants experience. For example, one respondent in the research by
Professors Massey and Sánchez R. noted “I never would say I am
351
American because nobody would believe me.” As Latino immigrants’
“Mexican appearance” continues to be a legitimate proxy for
unauthorized immigration status, the legal status of citizenship will
352
provide minimal social benefits.
C. Alternative Explanations
1. Naturalization as a Response to a Hostile Context
Immigrants may respond to a hostile environment in a variety of
ways. The argument presented in this Article focuses on rejecting
naturalization because the full range of social benefits may not be
available. It is also possible that Latino immigrants would respond to such
hostility by naturalizing in order to play a more prominent role in the
political process to change the government policies that create or
contribute to a hostile environment. In the wake of Proposition 187 in
353
Mexican immigrants across the country naturalized at
California,
354
increasing numbers. In 1994, 46,186 Mexican immigrants naturalized.
355
That number increased to 79,614 in 1995 and to 217,418 in 1996.
Latino immigrants exercised agency by naturalizing as a response to the
injustices experienced. While this undoubtedly explains why numerous
Latino immigrants naturalize, it does not help to explain the
disproportionate naturalization rates. If this was a primary motivator for
naturalization, Mexican immigrants’ naturalization rate should be on par
348
See, e.g., LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 87–89 (2006).
349
Id. at 87.
350
Id. at 88; see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26–62 (1883) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
351
MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ R., supra note 79, at 207.
352
See supra Part IV.B.
353
Proposition 187, 1994 Cal. Stat. A-317, invalidated by League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
354
IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1996 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 152 (1997).
355
Id.
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with, if not higher than, that of other nationalities. Yet this is not the
356
case. In 2010, only 10.8% of those who naturalized were Mexican
immigrants while 32.2% of those eligible to naturalize were Mexican
357
immigrants. These numbers suggest that a hostile environment is not
serving as a sufficient motivator for naturalization. Pantoja and Gershon
actually found that Latinos with a “positive political orientation” or
positive feelings about the US political system were more likely to
358
naturalize than those without such orientation or feelings.
2. Does Legal Status Matter?
Immigrants may perceive their environment as more or less hostile
depending on their immigration status. To the extent the enforcement
strategies creating a hostile environment are intended to discourage
unauthorized migration, those who are lawfully present may not
experience the enforcement strategies as hostile. For example, a German
executive with Mercedes-Benz was arrested outside of Tuscaloosa,
359
Alabama pursuant to the 2011 immigration law enacted in Alabama.
The executive was the subject of a traffic stop and he was only able to
produce a German identification card. He was arrested for not having
360
proper identification pursuant to the state law. Only after he was able
to retrieve his passport, visa, and German driver’s license from his hotel
361
was he released from prison. Whether this executive experienced his
arrest and detention as hostile could depend on his pre-existing ideas
about unauthorized migration and the appropriate strategies for
addressing it. The fact that he was released after presenting his passport,
visa, and German driver’s license may have mitigated the negative
experience.
Lawfully present migrants may share the opinions and feelings
underlying the increase in local immigration enforcement. Even if these
individuals are stopped for minor traffic violations they will generally be
able to demonstrate lawful presence. Lawfully present migrants may view
the stops as minor annoyances that are necessary to root out

356

See supra Part V.A.
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 53–55; RYTINA, supra note
13, at 4.
358
Adrian D. Pantoja & Sarah Allen Gershon, Political Orientations and Naturalization
Among Latino and Latina Immigrants, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 1171, 1178–80 (2006).
359
Naim, supra note 344.
360
Id.
361
Id. A similar incident occurred with a Japanese worker at an Alabama Honda
plant. The Japanese worker appears to have been stopped at a roadblock and ticketed.
The reason for the ticket is unknown. The worker had his passport and an international
driver’s license. Jay Reeves, Alabama Immigration Law Leads To Charge For Japanese Honda
Employee, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
11/30/alabama-immigration-law-honda_n_1121650.html.
357
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362

unauthorized migrants who make it hard for lawfully present migrants.
Alternatively if one is an unauthorized migrant, then one is the intended
target of the enforcement strategies and may view the environment as
more hostile. While immigration status can impact whether or not
certain enforcement strategies are experienced as creating a hostile
environment, the message that certain immigrants are a threat to
national security, public safety, or the American way of life is received by
all, authorized immigrants, unauthorized migrants, and citizens alike.
Research shows that hostility targeted at “illegal immigrants” reaches
beyond the target and impacts the lives of individuals perceived to be
363
unlawfully present. The Pew Hispanic Center reports that 36% of
Latino respondents reported that immigration status is the biggest cause
364
of anti-Latino bias. Professor Gerald Neuman has noted:
[T]he discourse of legal status permits coded discussion in which
listeners will understand that reference is being made, not to aliens
in the abstract, but to the particular foreign group that is the
principal focus of current hostility. A background of legal or social
disapproval of racial, religious or political discrimination creates
365
strong incentives for such coding.
Public discourse and immigration enforcement strategies often
366
conflate being Latino and being an unauthorized migrant. Individuals
who seem Latino, based on skin color, surname, or language, regardless
of their immigration status, can be on the receiving end of the hostility
367
directed toward “illegal immigrants.” For example, over 60% of the
anti-Latino abuses recorded by the Coalition for Humane Immigrant
Rights of Los Angeles after the passage of Proposition 187 in California
368
were directed against citizens or green-card holders.
362

See, e.g., PEW HISPANIC CENTER, 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY OF LATINOS: AS ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION ISSUE HEATS UP, HISPANICS FEEL A CHILL 2–3, 14 (2007), available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/84.pdf.
363
Tanya Broder & Clara Luz Navarro, A Street Without an Exit: Excerpts from the
Lives of Latinas in Post-187 California, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 275 (1996).
364
LOPEZ ET AL., supra note 275, at 9.
365
Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and
the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1425, 1429 (1995).
366
Broder and Navarro note that while Proposition 187 in California was
“[t]outed as an attack only on ‘illegal immigrants,’ the initiative’s effect has extended
far beyond the intended target, giving license to expressions of hatred against Latinos
and Asians, including legal residents and United States citizens.” Broder & Navarro,
supra note 363, at 278.
367
JIMÉNEZ, supra note 79, at 141 (“In a context of heavy Mexican immigration,
skin color and sometimes surname become markers of ethnic origin, nativity, and
even legal status in such a way that Mexican Americans become the direct targets of
nativism.”).
368
Broder & Navarro, supra note 363, at 278 n.11 (citing COALITION FOR HUMANE
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS OF LOS ANGELES (CHIRLA), HATE UNLEASHED: LOS ANGELES IN THE
AFTERMATH OF 187 16 (1995), reprinted in Nancy Cervantes et al., Hate Unleashed: Los
Angeles in the Aftermath of Proposition 187, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 20 (1995)).
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Pedro Ramírez’s experience with Border Patrol demonstrates the
ways in which efforts targeting unauthorized migrants impact the lives of
citizens and authorized migrants. Ramírez is a 52-year-old, Mexican369
American educator with a master’s degree. He lives in an uppermiddle-class area in Santa Maria, California. One afternoon, after doing
yard work at a rental property he owned, Ramírez was pulled over by
Border Patrol. The agent approached Ramírez in Spanish and Ramírez
370
responded, “May I help you?” To this the agent responded by asking
Ramírez for identification and if he spoke English. Ramírez provided a
driver’s license and the agent asked for additional identification. Ramírez
provided a social security card, at which point the agent asked for
additional identification. Ramírez responded by pulling out his American
371
Express card and said, “Don’t leave home without it.” Ramírez felt he
was being harassed because he was a “Mexican needing a haircut and a
shave on a Friday afternoon with a bandanna around his neck, with an
372
old pickup truck loaded with mowers and edgers and stuff like that.”
Ramírez got the Border Patrol agent’s license plate number and badge
number and sent several letters about the incident. He received several
373
responses that essentially said, “Oops, sorry.”
Ramírez’s experience is not unique, social scientists have
documented the use of skin color and surnames to mark Mexican
374
Americans as foreign, and often as unauthorized migrants. This has led
some immigrants to conclude that “no matter what they do to regularize
their status in this country and no matter how many became citizens,
375
immigrants and their children will continue to be unwelcome here.”
3. Variation Between Context of Reception Components
While local immigration enforcement strategies may contribute to a
hostile environment, other components of an immigrant’s environment
may neutralize the hostility. As noted in Part II, an immigrant’s
environment has national, regional, state, local, and interpersonal
376
Additionally an immigrant’s environment includes
components.
educational institutions, public health institutions, employers, social
377
welfare institutions, and electoral politics. While local immigration
enforcement strategies may suggest that the full range of social benefits
of citizenship are not available, other components of one’s environment
could provide conflicting information. For example, decisions by schools
or social welfare institutions not to check immigration status may suggest
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377

JIMÉNEZ, supra note 79, at 159.
Id.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 154–60.
Broder & Navarro, supra note 363, at 283.
See supra text accompanying notes 127–28.
MARROW, supra note 18, at 233–36.
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that Latinos are able to move about society without being presumed to be
foreign or unlawfully present. Additional research is necessary to better
understand the interplay between these different components of an
378
immigrant’s environment. For example, it may be that communities
utilizing racial profiling and minor traffic offenses as immigration
enforcement strategies could reduce the negative impact on
naturalization decisions if schools, social welfare institutions, and other
community entities provided a more positive environment.
The previous three sections have provided interesting questions for
future research to better understand the role of social benefits in
immigrants’ naturalization decisions. Current research does demonstrate
that a hostile environment matters. It is my contention that the use of
racial profiling and minor traffic offenses to identify unauthorized
migrants creates a hostile environment. As long as government officials
and the general public view Latino ethnicity as a proxy for unauthorized
immigration status, citizenship provides Latinos with little protection
against presumptions of unauthorized immigration status. Those with a
“Mexican appearance” will still experience pretextual traffic stops. While
these stops may last longer for noncitizens than for citizens, the initial
stop will still occur and potentially jeopardize Latinos’ sense of belonging
within the United States.
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Brignoni-Ponce reinforces the
marginal sense of belonging that Latinos can experience. Despite
acknowledging that the majority of Latinos in the United States are
citizens or lawful immigrants, the Court concluded that because
Mexicans accounted for the majority of the unauthorized migrant
379
population “Mexican appearance” is relevant. A host of factors other
than ethnic appearance are relevant for determining immigration status.
The Court identified some in Brignoni-Ponce including “characteristics of
380
the area in which [the officers] encounter a vehicle,” “the driver’s
381
382
behavior,” “[a]spects of the vehicle,” and “characteristic appearance
of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as the mode of
383
dress and haircut.” The difficulty in listing accurate indicators of
378

See id. passim (one of the few studies delineating different dimensions or
components of context of reception and exploring what they mean for Latino
immigrants in North Carolina).
379
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975).
380
Id. at 884.
381
Id. at 885. Examples of “the driver’s behavior” include driving erratically or
obviously attempting to evade officers. Id.
382
Id. “Aspects of the vehicle” includes factors such as “certain station wagons,
with large compartments for fold-down seats or spare tires,” a “heavily loaded”
appearance, a large number of passengers, or if the officers notice individuals trying
to hide. Id.
383
Id.; see also Chacón, supra note 11, at 145–46; Chin et al., supra note 257, at 70–
71; Johnson, supra note 30, at 1024. The use of ethnicity is complicated in new
destination areas in the Southeast where the portion of the Latino population that is
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unauthorized immigration status is that many factors will similarly
384
identify poor migrants. For example, those who have jobs that pay cash
and live in areas and units that are occupied by young men who migrated
without spouses or children could describe poor lawfully present
migrants as well as unauthorized migrants. There are provisions for
individuals with these types of characteristics to be lawfully present in the
United States. For example, H2-A visas are available for seasonal
385
Additionally
agricultural workers who may fit this description.
individuals admitted as green-card holders based on a family petition may
have these characteristics. It may be less likely that these individuals
would immigrate without their spouses and children, but uncertainty
about economic prospects may cause families to send one family member
386
at a time. Using these factors as proxies for unauthorized migrants
could similarly contribute to a hostile environment and dampen a greencard holder’s interest in naturalizing.
D. A Different Way Forward
A more effective strategy for identifying unauthorized migrants that
has less potential for discouraging naturalization is workplace
enforcement. By identifying individuals who are working without valid
social security numbers the government can more accurately target
individuals who are in fact unauthorized migrants. Rather than
deputizing local law enforcement officials to enforce immigration law,
the federal government could deputize state officials to conduct
workplace audits. The increased use of E-Verify is a step in this direction.
E-Verify is an internet-based system for determining employee eligibility
to work in the United States. The system accesses Social Security
Administration and Department of Homeland Security records to
unauthorized is higher than it is nationally or in older destination locations. See supra
text accompanying notes 25–29.
384
In United States v. Magana, Border Patrol officers explained that they had
reasonable suspicion to stop Magana’s truck because “[t]he six passengers appeared
to be farm workers, one of whom wore a hat which the officers emphasized was
indicative of someone who came from the Mexican state of Jalisco. They stated that
such hats, while often worn by illegal aliens, were seldom worn by anyone who had
lived in the United States for very long because it would bring them to the attention
of the INS.” 797 F.2d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1986). In Farm Labor Organizing Committee v.
Ohio State Highway Patrol, an Ohio State Highway Patrol officer testified that “he
became suspicious that a motorist was an illegal alien if the motorist was going to pick
crops, was coming from Florida or Texas, had little money, was driving an older
vehicle, and/or was wearing old clothes.” 95 F. Supp. 2d 723, 736 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
See Johnson, supra note 258, at 699–700 (noting that in practice the Border Patrol’s
profile for unauthorized migrants is based on class and race factors).
385
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2006).
386
It is not uncommon for the husband in a family to immigrate first and once
established send for his wife and children. PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA,
supra note 61, at 357.
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387

Numerous states are requiring
determine employment eligibility.
388
certain categories of employers or all employers to utilize this program.
E-Verify and workplace enforcement more generally are not without
389
their problems. For example, the accuracy of the system has been
called into question. In 2007, DHS commissioned an independent
evaluation of E-Verify. The evaluators concluded that the accuracy rates
did not meet the requirements established in the 1986 immigration
390
reforms introducing employer liability. The Office of Inspector General
estimated that approximately 7%of the Social Security records for
391
noncitizens were incorrect. These individuals were actually U.S. citizens
392
whose files mischaracterized them as noncitizens. E-Verify provides a
tentative confirmation of eligibility to work or a tentative nonconfirmation of authority to work. Tentative non-confirmations are the
result of an employee not being authorized to work, out of date records
at the Social Security Administration, or an input error by the
393
employer. Foreign-born workers are 30 times more likely to receive an
incorrect tentative non-confirmation than native-born workers, and 10%
394
of authorized foreign-workers receive tentative non-confirmations.
These errors can limit the employment opportunities of individuals.
Another challenge with workplace enforcement is which employers will
be targeted for government audits. If only employers who employ large
numbers of Latino migrants are the subject of government audits, similar
concerns regarding racial profiling could develop. Workplace
enforcement, however, can provide a more tailored approach to
identifying unauthorized migrants. It can limit the conflation of Latino

387

E-Verify FAQ, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13127.
388
Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia all require public employers to utilize E-Verify. See id.
As of November 2011 Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah also require certain private employers
to use E-Verify as well. Id.
389
See Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV.
1103 (2009).
390
WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE WEB BASIC PILOT EVALUATION 56 (2007), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/WebBasicPilotRprtSept2007.pdf.
391
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE REPORT: ACCURACY OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S NUMIDENT FILE ii (2006), available at
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-08-06-26100.pdf.
392
Id.
393
Naomi Barrowclough, Note, E-Verify: Long-Awaited ‘Magic Bullet’ or Weak Attempt
to Substitute Technology for Comprehensive Reform?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 791, 812 n.160
(2010) (citing Electronic Employment Verification Systems: Needed Safeguards to Protect
Privacy and Prevent Misuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship,
Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 49 (2008)
(statement of Johnathan “Jock” Scharfen)).
394
Id. at 812.
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395

ethnicity with unauthorized immigration status. It is this conflation that
undermines the social benefits that Latino immigrants can expect to
obtain by becoming citizens.
CONCLUSION
Immigration enforcement is undoubtedly an important goal, but so
is the incorporation of immigrants. The growth of “self-deportation”
policies undermines Latino immigrant incorporation. The use of racial
profiling and minor traffic violations in immigration enforcement is
contributing to a hostile environment for Mexican immigrants, which
reduces the likelihood that eligible Mexican immigrants will naturalize.
The disproportionate use of pretextual traffic stops in Latino
communities perpetuates the idea that those with a Latino appearance
are foreign and likely unauthorized. The connection made between
Latino appearance, foreign birth, and immigration status suggests that a
change in citizenship status absent a change in ethnicity will do little to
facilitate the social and economic mobility expected to come with
citizenship.
Social science research has demonstrated that decisions to naturalize
are shaped not only by the material benefits of citizenship, but also by the
social benefits of citizenship. Immigrants obtain valuable information
about whether immigrants are welcome, whether the host society values
immigrant contributions, and whether acceptance and mobility will be
possible from the structural and cultural aspects of their environment.
Immigrants are more likely to naturalize when they believe that they will
be able to take advantage of the full range of citizenship benefits. Further
research is needed to determine how immigrants value the material
benefits of citizenship compared to the social benefits. Are there contexts
in which one set of benefits outweighs another? Are certain types of
material and social benefits more important than others? Empirical
research on these and related questions will assist in developing
immigration policy that better balances our society’s desire for enforcing
federal immigration law and facilitating immigrant incorporation.
Efforts to enforce federal immigration law and identify unauthorized
migrants are felt by citizens, authorized migrants, and unauthorized
migrants when ethnicity is used as the primary, or a significant, factor.
The use of this strategy may enable ICE to identify a greater number of
unauthorized migrants, but it will come at the cost of alienating potential
395

Identifying serious criminals, those in Secure Communities Level one and two
categories, is a legitimate enforcement priority and local law enforcement officers
could play a role in identifying these individuals. This could be accomplished by
revising 287(g) jail agreements to only apply to individuals charged with Level one
and two crimes or to focus on individuals who are incarcerated after a conviction for
a Level one or two crime. These alternatives would allow for a more robust system for
identifying serious criminals who are noncitizens and remove the incentive for
officers to use minor traffic offenses as a pretext for ascertaining immigration status.
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citizens and limiting the incorporation of Latino immigrants in the
United States.

